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U.S. asylum law is based on a domestic statute that incorporates an
international treaty, the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
While Supreme Court cases indicate that the rules of treaty interpretation
apply to an incorporative statute, courts analyzing the statutory asylum pro-
visions fail to give weight to the interpretations of our sister signatories,
which is one of the distinctive and uncontroversial principles of treaty inter-
pretation. This Article highlights this significant omission and urges courts
to examine the interpretations of other States Parties to the Protocol in asy-
lum cases. Using as an example the current debate over social visibility in
defining a "particular social group," which is a part of the definition of a
"refugee," the Article demonstrates the utility of a comparative analysis even
when our sister signatories' interpretations are not uniform. The Article also
addresses some of the challenges involved in examining foreign authority,
including: how to select and weigh such authority in the context of treaty
interpretation; what weight, if any, courts should give to the interpretation
of the European Union; and how courts should treat the interpretations of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Article concludes
that asylum and refugee law is an area ripe for deeper transnational dia-
logue, in which U.S. courts should play a critical part.
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I. INTRODUCTION
United States asylum law binds a domestic statute, the Ref-
ugee Act of 1980, to an international treaty, the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Protocol"). The statute di-
rectly incorporates key parts of the treaty, including the defini-
tion of a "refugee."' When U.S. courts adjudicate asylum cases,
they usually focus on the domestic statute, applying the rules
for statutory interpretation and ignoring the incorporated
treaty. This method of interpretation results in a significant
omission: Courts routinely fail to consider the interpretations
of our sister signatories, despite the Supreme Court's position
that those interpretations are entitled to considerable weight.2
Taking into account the interpretations of other States Parties
is necessary to promote uniform application of a contract
among nations. By failing to engage in this comparative analy-
sis, U.S. courts risk undermining the process of norm conver-
gence and contributing to the fragmentation of refugee law.
This Article contends that U.S. courts should examine the
interpretations of our sister signatories to the Protocol when
analyzing incorporative parts of the Refugee Act by providing
a specific example of how this would work in practice and pro-
posing a framework for selecting and weighing foreign author-
ities.3 Part II provides background about the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol, and
their relationship to U.S. domestic law. Part III explains the
1. The definition of a "refugee" in the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) incorporates the definition in
the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol]. The Protocol, in turn, sub-
stantively incorporates the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art.
1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
2. See Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S.Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010) ("the opinions of
our sister signatories [should be] entitled to considerable weight" in inter-
preting a treaty) (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985); El Al
Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999)).
3. This argument draws on John F. Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the
Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 655 (2010).
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basic rules of treaty interpretation under both the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and Supreme Court
precedents, focusing on the role that foreign authorities play
under both sources of law and examining how they relate to
each other. This Part also demonstrates that while the princi-
ple of giving weight to the interpretations of our sister signato-
ries is well established in Supreme Court precedents, confu-
sion and disagreement persists regarding how to select and
weigh foreign authorities. After explaining the role of foreign
authorities in direct treaty interpretation, Part III argues that
the same interpretive rules apply to an incorporative statute
such as the Refugee Act and that courts usually make the same
mistake of failing to consider the views of our sister signatories
in this context.
In Part IV, the Article provides a comparative analysis of a
current controversy related to the definition of a "refugee"
that has resulted in a circuit split: whether "social visibility" (or
social perception) is required to establish a "particular social
group," one of the most ambiguous terms in the refugee defi-
nition. 4 The Refugee Convention provides, in relevant part,
that a refugee is someone who, "owing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country."5 The U.S. statute reflects essentially the same
definition.6 By examining trends in other signatories' ap-
proaches to interpreting a "particular social group," the differ-
ent ways that some contracting parties have interpreted and
applied the concept of social perception, and how a social per-
ception approach has impacted the development of refugee
4. See infra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
5. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, 1 A(2); Protocol, supra note
1, art. I, 1 2.
6. INA § 101 (a) (42) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) (defining a refugee
as "any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion"); see also DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN
THE UNITED STATES § 1:2 (2011).
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law in the countries that have adopted it, Part IV demonstrates
the utility of a comparative analysis for U.S. courts even when
the interpretations of our sister signatories are not uniform.
Part V addresses the gap between the principle of giving
weight to our sister signatories' interpretations and the actual
practice of U.S. courts by providing a framework for selecting
and weighing foreign authorities. This section sets forth three
conditions that should be satisfied as "ground rules" for selec-
tion, as well as several factors to consider in determining how
much weight to give a particular interpretation. After setting
forth this framework, Part V addresses what weight, if any,
should be given to the interpretations of a regional body, the
European Union (EU), which has recently taken ground-
breaking steps towards creating a common asylum system, and
addresses whether the interpretations of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) should factor
into the comparative analysis. The Article highlights problems
with attributing the EU's interpretations to its Member States
and cautions against treating UNHCR as a state party. Finally,
Part V addresses concerns that giving weight to foreign author-
ity may weaken the protection given to asylum seekers in the
United States.
Incorporative statutes are rare creatures in U.S. law and
surprisingly little scholarship has addressed them, although
"they arguably represent the most straightforward, most demo-
cratic, and least controversial means of incorporating interna-
tional law currently available."7 This Article contributes to that
small but growing body of scholarship by exploring the role
that foreign authority should play in U.S. asylum adjudication.
7. See Coyle, supra note 3, at 660-61 (" [T]he academic literature in the
United States has paid relatively little attention to incorporative statutes.");
Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist
Paths Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DuKE L.J. 1059, 1069 (2011) ("[T]he
Refugee Act is one of a small number of incorporative statutes that directly
incorporate international treaty language and concepts into U.S. domestic
law."). Other examples of incorporative statutes include 9 U.S.C. § 207
(2006) giving effect to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 25 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3,
which is commonly known as the New York Convention, and the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936), (codified at 46 U.S.C.
§ 30701 (2011)), which mirrors the text of the International Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924,
51 Stat. 233, 120 L.N.T.S. 155.
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Since immigration appeals constitute about one out of six
cases on the federal appellate docket, with asylum and related
cases comprising a substantial portion of those appeals, deci-
sions regarding what body of interpretive rules to apply to asy-
lum appeals can have life or death consequences for
thousands of individuals.8 In short, the issues discussed here
are not merely abstract arguments about treaty interpretation.
They have the most visceral of consequences for the asylum
seekers involved.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE REFUGEE CONVENTION AND
PROTOCOL AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP
To DOMESTIC LAW
When the United Nations was created in the aftermath of
World War II, it had to address the plight of millions of dis-
placed people throughout Europe, many of whom did not
wish to return to their countries of origin. In 1949, the
UNHCR was established as a subsidiary organ of the General
Assembly.9 Its mandate, which has expanded over time, in-
volves providing international protection and seeking perma-
nent solutions for refugees.' 0 In 1951, U.N. member states
adopted the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
which forms the foundation of international refugee law."
The Refugee Convention was developed in an era of emerging
concern for the protection of international human rights.' 2 Its
8. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59
DUKE LJ. 1635, 1646 (2010) (providing the percentage of combined
caseloads of the courts of appeals that are petitions for review of immigra-
tion appeals). In the Second and Ninth Circuits, immigration appeals com-
prise about one-third of the docket. Id. at 1647.
9. Refugees and Stateless Persons, G.A. Res. 319 (IV), U.N. Doc. A/
RES/319(IV) (Dec. 3, 1949); Statute of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess.,
Supp. No. 20, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Dec. 14, 1950).
10. UNHCR, AN INTRODucrION TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 7-8
(2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6bd5a0.pdf.
11. Refugee Convention, supra note 1.
12. Other milestones in the development of international human rights
law that occurred within a few years of the Refugee Convention include: the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; and the
four Geneva Conventions on the laws of war-Geneva Convention for the
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Preamble explicitly references the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and "the principle that human beings shall en-
joy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimina-
tion."1 8 In defining who qualifies as a refugee and establishing
minimum standards of protection, the Refugee Convention
"represents a milestone in the emergence of a global will to
address problems of forced displacement."1 4
Since the Refugee Convention was a response to the
human rights atrocities that occurred in Europe during World
War II, it was limited in its reach to individuals who became
refugees as a result of events that took place before 1951, and
states had the option of limiting the Convention's application
to events that occurred in Europe.15 As additional refugee cri-
ses developed around the world, however, it became clear that
more widespread protection was required. The massive refu-
gee movements that occurred during the turbulent process of
decolonizing Africa in the 1960s, in particular, spurred the in-
ternational community to take further action.' 6 In 1967, the
United Nations adopted a Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, which requires parties to comply with Articles 2
through 34 of the Refugee Convention and removes the tem-
poral and geographic restrictions on the definition of a "refu-
gee."17 The Protocol, like the Convention, requires parties to
cooperate with UNHCR and facilitate its duties of supervi-
sion.18
The United States ratified the Protocol in 1968 but took
over a decade to conform its practices to the Protocol.' 9
Before Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, U.S. refugee
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelio-
ration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
13. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
14. UNHCR, supra note 10, at 9.
15. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, 11 A(2)-B.
16. UNHCR, supra note 10, at 9.
17. Protocol, supra note 1, art I, 11 1-3.
18. Id., art II.
19. See ANKER, supra note 6, § 1.1 (discussing the history of U.S. asylum
law).
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determinations were largely ad hoc.20 The Refugee Act of 1980
amended the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965
("INA") to include a definition of a "refugee" that is "virtually
identical to the one prescribed by Article 1(2) of the Conven-
tion"21 and to establish an alternative, mandatory form of re-
lief called withholding of removal, which reflects the interna-
tional norm of non-refoulement by prohibiting the return of an
individual to a country where her life or freedom would be
threatened. 22 The legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980
explicitly states that Congress intended to conform U.S. do-
mestic law to the nation's international obligations under the
Protocol 23 and give "statutory meaning to our national com-
mitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns."24 The
Supreme Court has confirmed Congress's intent to actualize
our international obligations based on the legislative history of
the Refugee Act and the adoption of a definition of "refugee"
that mirrors the definition in the Protocol. 2 5
After Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, another
decade passed before regulations created a specially trained
group of asylum officers with the authority to grant asylum in
20. Id.; see also Deborah Anker & Michael Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A
Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9 (1981).
21. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987).
22. ANKER, supra note 6, § 1.3; INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a) (42) (A) (2011) (defining a "refugee"); INA § 241 (b) (3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b) (3) (providing for withholding of removal); see also Farbenblum,
supra note 7, at 1070-73 (describing asylum and withholding of removal as
two forms of domestic relief based on the Refugee Convention).
23. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 18 (1979) (describing the amendments as
necessary "so that U.S. statutory law clearly reflects our legal obligations
under international agreements"). The House Judicial Committee deemed
it "both necessary and desirable that United States domestic law include [Ar-
ticle 33 of the Convention]" in the withholding of deportation provision of
the statute and found it "desirable, for the sake of clarity, to conform the
language of that section to the Convention." Id.; see also Farbenblum, supra
note 7, at 1068-70 (discussing how Congress intended congruence between
the Refugee Act of 1980 and the Convention).
24. S. REP. No. 96-256, at 1 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141,
144; see also In re S-P-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 486, 492 (B.I.A. 1996) (quoting the
same language from the congressional report).
25. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436-37 (finding that in enacting the Ref-
ugee Act of 1980, Congress intended "to bring United States refugee law
into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees . . . to which the United States acceded in 1968").
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individual cases.26 Asylum officers determine eligibility in cases
where the applicants are not in removal proceedings. If asylum
is not granted, the case is generally referred to immigration
court, where an immigration judge provides de novo adjudica-
tion of the asylum application in removal proceedings. There
are over fifty immigration courts throughout the United
States. Decisions by immigration judges are appealable to an
agency called the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"),
which, along with the immigration courts, is part of the Execu-
tive Office for Immigration Review within the Department of
Justice. Decisions by the BIA can be appealed directly to the
U.S. Courts of Appeals. 27 If a federal appellate court disagrees
with the BIA's interpretation, the court's interpretation be-
comes binding on all cases arising within its jurisdiction, but
the BIA's interpretation still governs cases arising in other ju-
risdictions. The BIA therefore plays a crucial role in either
promoting or undermining uniformity in U.S. asylum adjudi-
cation.
Recognizing that U.S. refugee law is rooted in an interna-
tional treaty and incorporates key provisions of that treaty is
the starting point for understanding why the interpretations of
other contracting parties to the Protocol are relevant to do-
mestic asylum cases. How the BIA and federal courts should
give meaning to these international obligations when adjudi-
cating asylum cases is the focus of this Article.
III. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AUTHORTY IN INTERPRETING
TREATIES AND INCORPORATIVE STATUTES
This Part analyzes the role of interpretations by our sister
signatories under both the VCLT and U.S. Supreme Court
precedents. Section A explores the potential for using foreign
authority as a form of subsequent practice under Article 31 of
the VCLT, as well as a supplementary means of interpretation
under Article 32 of the VCLT, arguing that the latter is the
more realistic approach. The discussion in Section B then
shows that the principle adopted by the Supreme Court, which
provides that the interpretations of our sister signatories are
26. ANKER, supra note 6, § 1.3.
27. The location of the immigration court that made the initial determi-
nation in the case dictates which U.S. Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
the appeal.
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"entitled to considerable weight," makes comparative analysis
mandatory, giving teeth to the otherwise optional use of for-
eign authority as a supplementary means of interpretation.
Yet, despite providing strong support for this principle, Su-
preme Court decisions point to persistent areas of confusion
and disagreement about how to select and weigh foreign au-
thorities, which may explain the reluctance of lower courts to
engage in such analysis and flags a need for further guidance.
Section C contends that these same rules of treaty interpreta-
tion apply to an incorporative statute and that courts are re-
miss in not considering the views of other contracting parties
to the Protocol when adjudicating asylum cases.
A. The Role of Foreign Authority Under the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties
The rules of treaty interpretation are set forth in Articles
31 and 32 of the VCLT.28 Although the United States has not
ratified the VCLT, it is widely accepted as customary interna-
tional law and often applied as such by U.S. courts.29 Article
31(1) provides that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object
and purpose."30 Article 31(3) (b) goes on to explain that
"[t] here shall be taken into account, together with the context ...
any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which estab-
28. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
29. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 949 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002)
("While the United States is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention, it is
the policy of the United States to apply articles 31 and 32 as customary inter-
national law"), abrogated on other grounds by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S.Ct. 1983
(2010); Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp. 247 F.3d 423, 433 (2d Cir. 2001)
("we apply the rules of customary international law enunciated in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties"); Aquamar, S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Pro-
duce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1296 n.40 (11th Cir. 1999) ("Although the
United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it regards the substan-
tive provisions of the Vienna Convention as codifying the international law
of treaties.") (quoting Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d
634, 638 n.9 (5th Cir. 1994))); Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT'L. L. 431, 434 (2004)
("No member of the [Supreme] Court has ever appealed to the Vienna Con-
vention for an independent and controlling rule of decision.").
30. VCLT, supra note 28, art. 31, 1 1.
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lishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpreta-
tion."3 1 This language indicates that examining subsequent
practice is a required step in treaty interpretation. The promi-
nent role given to "subsequent practice" under the Vienna
Convention is a key feature that distinguishes treaty interpreta-
tion from the interpretation of a domestic statute.32 The Inter-
national Court ofJustice has confirmed the importance of sub-
sequent practice in treaty interpretation, explaining, "it consti-
tutes objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as
to the meaning of the treaty."33 This emphasis on subsequent
practice reflects how treaties are closer to contracts than to
legislation, requiring mutual understanding and agreement
among the signatories. 34 According to one commentator,
"concordant practice of the parties is [the] best evidence of their
correct interpretation" of a treaty.35
Subsequent practice may include judicial decisions or leg-
islative acts that reflect a consistent interpretation among con-
tracting parties.36 As a practical matter, however, it is usually
extremely difficult to demonstrate subsequent practice
through such unilateral domestic action.37 Establishing subse-
31. Id., art. 31, 1 3(b) (emphasis added).
32. RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 225 (2008).
33. Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1 49 (Dec.
13).
34. GARDINER, supra note 32, at 225.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Search For the One, True Meaning. in
THE Limrrs OF TRANSNATIONAL LAw: REFUGEE LAw, POLICE HARMONIZATION
AND JUDICIAL DIALOGUE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 204, 209-10, 218 (Guy S.
Goodwin-Gill & Hlne Lambert, eds. 2010) (noting that national court de-
cisions may indicate subsequent practice so long as they are common to or
accepted by all parties); see also Klaus Ferdinand Garditz, International Deci-
sions, Article 36: Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 101 AM. J. INT'L L
627, 634 (2007) ("Decisions of domestic courts are state practice .... In
addition, domestic adjudication constitutes subsequent practice, which is of
importance to treaty interpretation pursuant to Article 31(3) (b) of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties."); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998
Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 649-50
(1998) (describing domestic courts as important "law-declaring fora" that
define and interpret the norms of international law).
37. See Alexander M. Feldman, Note, Evolving Treaty Obligations: A Propo-
sal for Analyzing Subsequent Practice Derived from WTO Dispute Settlement, 41
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 655, 663-64 (2009) (explaining that subsequent
practice in general has proved difficult to determine and apply). Recogniz-
ing the need to develop greater understanding about the role that subse-
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quent practice involves showing "a 'concordant, common and
consistent' sequence of acts or pronouncements which is suffi-
cient to establish a discernable pattern implying the agree-
ment of the parties regarding its interpretation."3 8 While not
all contracting parties must engage in a practice to show that it
is "common" and "concordant," the actions of just a few par-
ties normally will not suffice .39 One of the most complex ques-
tions in analyzing subsequent practice is how to treat parties
that are silent or do not react to a given practice. 40 As a gen-
eral matter, silence alone is insufficient to infer a party's agree-
ment with a practice. 4 1 But when a party has been made aware
of a practice that calls for reaction and fails to react, agree-
ment may be inferred.4 2 Overt disagreement, on the other
quent practice and agreement play for treaty interpretation, the Interna-
tional Law Commission established a Study Group on this topic in 2008 and
appointed Georg Nolte, who was the Chair of the Study Group, as a Special
Rapporteur in 2012. Mr. Nolte's introductory report on subsequent practice
and agreement demonstrated that the jurisprudence of the ICJ and arbitral
tribunals of ad hocjurisdiction "does not permit a comprehensive assessment
of the matter, leaves certain lacunae, and even raises new questions." GEORG
NOLTE, INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION STUDY GROUP ON TREATIES OVER
TIME, INTRODUCTORY REPORT: JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OFJUSTICE AND ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS OF Ad HocJurisdiction Relating to Subse-
quent Agreements and Subsequent Practice 4 (2010), available at http://
www. auswaertiges-amt. de / cae /servlet/ contentblob / 582682 / publication
File/156231/NolteTreatiesOverTimel.pdf); see also Rep. of the Int'l Law
Comm'n, 65th Sess., May 3-June 4, July 5-Aug. 6, 2010, U.N. Doc. A/65/10,
U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., at 334 (2010) (describing the discussions of the
Study Group).
38. Appellate Body Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 11, WT/
DS8/AB/R, WT/DS1O/AB/R, WT/DS11AB/R (Oct. 4,1996).
39. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Customs Classifica-
tion of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, 1 259, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS269/
AB/R (Sept. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Chicken Cuts Appellate Body Report]
(discussing the requirements for establishing a "concordant, common, and
discernible pattern").
40. NOLTE, supra note 37, at 32.
41. See Chicken Cuts Appellate Body Report, supra note 39, 1 272 (expres-
sing "misgivings about deducing, without further inquiry, agreement with a
practice from a party's 'lack of reaction'") (emphasis added); Kasikili/Sedudu
Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1 64-68 (Dec. 13) (holding that
agreement could not be inferred from a state's failure to react to the find-
ings of a joint commission of experts regarding a disputed matter).
42. See, e.g., Chicken Cuts Appellate Body Report, supra note 39, 1 272
(explaining that in specific situations, "the 'lack of reaction' or silence by a
particular treaty party may, in the light of attendant circumstances, be un-
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
402 [Vol. 45:391
2013] FOREIGN AUTHORITIES IN U.S. ASYLUM ADJUDICATION
hand, undercuts the existence of a "concordant" and "consis-
tent" practice. 4 3 It is difficult to establish subsequent practice
based on domestic judicial decisions or legislative acts simply
because it is unlikely that either the jurists or legislators in a
substantial number of contracting parties to a major treaty
have addressed a particular issue in a completely consistent
way and, even if they had, it would be hard to interpret the
silence of the remaining parties as evidence of agreement with
that interpretation. The silent parties may not be aware of the
jurisprudence or legislation in other countries and, even if
aware of these public pronouncements, most likely could not
be expected to react to them.44
derstood as acceptance of the practice of other treaty parties," such as when
a party has been made aware of the practice of other parties but does not
react to it); Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 23
(June 15) (holding that a state acquiesced to a map where it was "clear that
the circumstances were such as called for some reaction, within a reasonable
period" and the state did not raise any serious questions or disagree with the
map); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 395, 36-39 (Nov. 26) (finding agreement based on si-
lence combined with other evidence); Arbitral Award Made by the King of
Spain on 23 December 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 4, 209 (" [N]o
objection was taken before the King of Spain to his proceeding with the
arbitration on the ground that the Gdmez-Gomilla Treaty had already ex-
pired."); Beagle Channel (Arg. v. Chile), 21 R.I.A.A. 55, 11 172-74 (Feb. 18,
1977) (holding that the silence of Argentina permitted the inference that it
agreed to acts of jurisdiction by Chile over certain islands); see also NOLTE,
supra note 37, at 33-36 (discussing judicial decisions that inferred agree-
ment from silence).
43. See Panel Report, United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), 7.218, WT/DS294/R (Oct. 31,
2005) (indicating that any disagreement undermines subsequent practice by
reasoning that "even if it were established conclusively that all 76 Members
referred to by the European Communities have adopted a-practice of apply-
ing Article 2.4.2 to duty assessment, this would only mean that a considera-
ble number of WTO Members have adopted an approach different from
that of the United States" and noting that a third party to the proceedings
had contested the view of the European Communities).
44. See NOLTE, supra note 37, at 33 (discussing how judicial bodies have
been reluctant to accept domestic parliamentary proceedings and docu-
ments as evidence of subsequent practice because other parties to the treaty
could not be expected to react to such proceedings and documents even if
they were aware of them); Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan
(Indon. v. Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. 625, 1 48 (finding that although a map in-
scribed with a boundary line comprised part of the legislative documents
transmitted to the British government, Britain's lack of reaction to the
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Where domestic judicial decisions and legislation do not
meet the standard required to show subsequent practice
under Article 31(3) (b), however, they may still serve as a "sup-
plementary means of interpretation" under Article 32 of the
VCLT.4 5 Article 32 provides that "[r]ecourse may be had to
supplementary means of interpretation, including the prepar-
atory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclu-
sion," in order to confirm the meaning derived under Article
31 or to clarify the meaning when Article 31 leaves it ambigu-
ous or leads to an unreasonable result.4 6 Since Article 32
neither requires the use of supplementary means nor enumer-
ates what means may be used, it gives substantial discretion to
those interpreting the treaty.
Article 38(d) of the ICJ statute mentions two specific
sources that serve as "subsidiary means for the determination
of rules of law" and therefore qualify as supplementary means
under Article 32 of the VCLT: "judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations."4 7 Some tribunals commonly employ these interpre-
tive tools. For example, an empirical study examining how ad
hoc tribunals of the International Centre for Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (ICSID) engaged in treaty interpretation
demonstrated that legal doctrine was used as an interpretive
tool in 73 of 98 decisions, making it "one of the most impor-
tant interpretive arguments."48 In almost all instances, the
tribunals referred to books or articles written by individual ex-
perts, frequently using the legal doctrine "to establish or de-
fine 'tests' to be used as conditions for applying rules" and to
resolve substantive issues. 49 In addition, the ICSID tribunals re-
boundary line on the map could not be deemed acquiescence to that bound-
ary).
45. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 36, at 209-10.
46. VCLT, supra note 28, art. 32.
47. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38; see also Ole Kris-
tian Fachald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals - An Empirical Analysis, 19
EUR.J. INT'L L. 301, 351 (2008) (arguing that "[I] egal doctrine is not explic-
itly referred to as a relevant interpretive argument in the VCLT, but it can be
assumed to be covered by Article 32 as a supplemental means of interpreta-
tion" in light of Article 38 of the ICJ statute).
48. Fachald, supra note 47, at 352.
49. Id. In discussing why the ICSID tribunals treated legal doctrine as
"one of the most important interpretive arguments," Fachald notes, "there is
an extensive legal doctrine of a particularly high quality in the field of inter-
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ferred to the judicial decisions of domestic courts in 13 of the
98 decisions, which far outnumbered references to other types
of unilateral action, such as the legislative measures men-
tioned in three of the decisions.50 While other tribunals may
not rely on judicial decisions or scholarly writing to the same
extent, the example of the ICSID tribunals confirms that do-
mestic judicial decisions and legislation can and do influence
treaty interpretation. 51
B. The U.S. Supreme Court's Principle That the Interpretations
of Our Sister Signatories are "Entitled
to Considerable Weight"
The U.S. Supreme Court's approach to treaty interpreta-
tion generally reflects the same factors set forth in the VCLT-
including the text, context, object, and purpose of the treaty-
although the Court tends to address these factors in a less sys-
tematic way and often employs a broader understanding of
"context."52 Regarding the role of foreign authority in treaty
interpretation, the Court has endorsed the principle that "the
opinions of our sister signatories [are] entitled to considerable
national investment law" and "relatively few experts on international invest-
ment law." Id. Refugee law resembles international investment law in these
two ways. Moreover, some of the interpretive questions raised by refugee law,
including the definition of a "particular social group" discussed in Part III,
infra, focus on different tests that have been developed through legal doc-
trine, making it precisely the type of issue where legal doctrine is commonly
invoked by ICSID tribunals to help interpret an international treaty.
50. Id. at 347-48. While Fachald discusses judicial decisions as a form of
"state practice," she explains that this is not the type of state practice men-
tioned in Article 31(3) (b) of the VCLT and notes that it may be "better to
characterize such acts as expressions of legal opinion than as expressions of
practice." Id. at 348-49.
51. Fachald notes that the ICJ and WTO "make much less use of legal
doctrine." Id. at 352.
52. GARDINER, supra note 32, at 136-38; see also Zicherman v. Korean Air
Lines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) (stating that the "postratification
understanding of the contracting parties" has traditionally served as an aid
to treaty interpretation); U.S. v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) ("The prac-
tice of treaty signatories counts as evidence of the treaty's proper interpreta-
tion, since their conduct generally evinces their understanding of the agree-
ment they signed."); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466
U.S. 243, 260 (1984) ("The conduct of the contracting parties in implement-
ing that contract in the first 50 years of its operation cannot be ignored.").
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weight."53 This principle remains uncontroversial, finding sup-
port among both liberal and conservative members of the
Court, unlike the intensely debated use of foreign authorities
in constitutional interpretation.54 The role of other parties' in-
terpretations under the Supreme Court's standard seems to
fall somewhere in between "subsequent practice" and "supple-
mentary means" under the VCLT. Since the Court does not
suggest that the views of our sister signatories must be "com-
mon, concordant, and consistent" to influence treaty interpre-
tation, its standard is less rigorous than what is required to es-
tablish subsequent practice under Article 31 of the VCLT. Yet
the Supreme Court's standard does not permit as much flexi-
bility and judicial discretion as Article 32 of the VCLT. In stat-
ing that other parties' interpretations are "entitled" to consid-
erable weight, the Supreme Court indicates that courts must
consider these interpretations, whereas Article 32 merely pro-
vides that courts "may" utilize supplementary means, making it
optional.
Despite issuing numerous decisions confirming the prin-
ciple of giving considerable weight to the interpretations of
our sister signatories, the Supreme Court has not provided
more specific guidance about how to select and weigh foreign
authorities. Nor has the Court clarified how the interpreta-
tions of other contracting parties should fit in with interpreta-
tions based on the treaty's text, context, object, and purpose.
Consequently, in cases where the Court has invoked the princi-
53. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (quoting Benjamins v.
British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 (2d. Cir. 1978)) (relying on
French decisions and writings by European legal scholars regarding Swiss
and German law in unanimously holding that the term "accident" under the
Warsaw Convention excludes injuries "caused by an unusual or unexpected
event or happening"); see also Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S.Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010)
(reasoning that the principle that our sister signatories' interpretations are
entitled to considerable weight applies with special force where Congress has
specifically stressed uniform interpretation of the Convention); El Al Israel
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999) (quoting the
principle in Saks and consulting cases from the U.K. House of Lords, Ca-
nada, the New Zealand Court of Appeal, and the Singapore Court of Appeal
in holding that an air carrier's liability is limited to claims arising under the
Warsaw Convention, such that the passenger could not sue the airline for
tort damages in state court).
54. See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660 (2004) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("We can, and should, look to decisions of other signatories
when we interpret treaty provisions.").
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ple of giving weight to our sister signatories' interpretations,
the majority and dissent often disagree about the manner in
which foreign authorities are chosen and applied. This section
briefly discusses three Supreme Court cases that exemplify
such disagreement to underscore the need for guiding princi-
ples on the use of foreign authority in treaty interpretation
and to explain why lower courts often skip the important step
of examining our sister signatories' views.
In Olympic Airways, the Court had to determine how to
interpret the word "accident" under the Warsaw Convention,
which governs liability for international air carriers. The ma-
jority held that a passenger's death from an asthma attack dur-
ing the flight was an "accident" due to a flight attendant's unu-
sual conduct in thrice refusing to move the passenger further
away from the smoking section of the plane. In reaching this
conclusion, the majority chose not to attach much weight to a
few decisions by intermediate appellate courts in the United
Kingdom and Australia, noting that it had rejected the reason-
ing of these courts in the body of its opinion, distinguishing
the facts of the foreign cases, and stressing that the "courts of
last resort-the House of Lords and the High Court of Austra-
lia-have yet to speak" on the issue at hand.5 5
Justice Scalia's dissent forcefully disagreed, stressing that
"[w]e can, and should, look to decisions of other signatories
when we interpret treaty provisions."5 6 He took the majority to
task for "its failure to give any serious consideration to how the
courts of our treaty partners have resolved the legal issues
before us" and deemed the decisions by "appellate courts in
both England and Australia . .. squarely at odds with [the]
holding."5 7 The dispute between the majority and dissent in
Olympic Airways raises questions about the relevance of such
factors as the number of foreign authorities that adopt a certain
interpretation of the treaty, the level of courts that have ad-
dressed the issue, and the degree of similarity between cases
when giving weight to the interpretations of our sister signato-
ries.
The Court's decision in Sanchez-Llamas raises similar ques-
tions regarding how to apply the principle of giving weight to
55. Id. at 655 n.9 (majority opinion).
56. Id. at 660 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 658.
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the interpretations of our sister signatories. There, the major-
ity opinion by Chief Justice Roberts interpreted Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which requires
authorities to notify detained foreign nationals of their right to
contact their consulate.58 In discussing whether a violation of
that right should lead to the suppression of incriminating
statements, Justice Roberts stressed that "[t]he exclusionary
rule as we know it is an entirely American legal creation" that
"is still 'universally rejected' by other countries."59 Accord-
ingly, he found "no reason to suppose that Sanchez-Llamas
would be afforded the relief he seeks here in any of the other
169 countries party to the Vienna Convention."60 Justice Rob-
erts acknowledged that "in a few cases," the United Kingdom,
Australia, and Canada have recognized a discretionary rule of
exclusion for violations of domestic statutes implementing the
Vienna Convention, but these cases did not persuade him that
Sanchez-Llamas would succeed in suppressing his statements
in another country.61
The dissent, authored by Justice Breyer and joined byJus-
tices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg in part, agreed on the im-
portance of examining the interpretations of other signatories
and relied on the foreign decisions in disputing the majority's
conclusion that Sanchez-Llamas would be denied suppression
in all contracting states. The dissent reasoned that cases from
Australia and Canada supported its position that suppression
may be an appropriate remedy in some circumstances. 62 While
the dissent conceded the absence of such decisions from civil
law countries, it reasoned that this absence "tells us nothing at
all," since the criminal justice systems in civil law systems allow
judges simply to disregard improperly obtained evidence, dis-
count its significance, or adjust the final sentence, rather than
58. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
59. Id. at 343-44.
60. Id. at 344.
61. Id. at 344 n.3; see generally Melissa A. Waters, Treaty Dialogue in
Sanchez-Llamas: Is ChiefJustice Roberts a Transnationalist, After All?, 11 LEWIS &
CLRuK L. REv. 89, 89 (2007) (arguing that "[bly engaging in dialogue with
both treaty partners and the International Court of Justice, Roberts allows
foreign precedent and practice to influence the Court's interpretation of the
treaty provisions while at the same time using dialogue to 'educate' the ICJ
on the American adversarial system").
62. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 394-95 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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formally suppressing the evidence.63 The dissent noted that in
one case from Germany the judge's denial of a request to sup-
press was the only support for the claim that the petitioners
were asking the United States for a remedy that other coun-
tries deny.64
Thus, the disagreement between the majority and dissent
in Sanchez-Llamas did not concern whether to examine foreign
precedents, but, rather, what conclusions to reach in light of
those precedents. 65 As in Olympic Airways, the majority and dis-
sent disputed what weight to give the decisions of a few other
countries as well as the relevance of those decisions to the is-
sue at hand. Sanchez-Llamas also indicates that the interpreta-
tions of the foreign authorities need not be unanimous to
merit consideration and influence the Justices. Moreover, the
case highlights how differences between common law and civil
law systems can color perception of their judicial decisions. In
pointing out that defendants may not need to file motions to
suppress in civil law countries because of the different role
played by the judge, Justice Breyer suggests that courts cannot
consider foreign authorities in isolation from the legal systems
through which decisions are made.66 In other words, how
courts weigh foreign authorities may turn, in part, on the na-
ture of the legal systems involved.
Most recently, the Supreme Court confirmed the princi-
ple of giving "considerable weight" to our sister signatories to a
treaty in Abbott, a case arising under the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ("Conven-
tion") and its implementing domestic statute, the Interna-
tional Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA).67 The ICARA
authorizes a person who seeks a child's return to file a petition
in state or federal court and provides that the court "shall de-
63. Id. at 395-96.
64. Id. at 396.
65. Similarly, both the majority and dissent engaged in a detailed discus-
sion of relevant decisions by the International Court of Justice, recognizing
that such decisions merit "respectful consideration," since "uniformity is an
important goal of treaty interpretation," but disagreeing about the results.
Id. at 382-83.
66. Id. at 395-96.
67. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S.Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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cide the case in accordance with the Convention."68 In the text
of ICARA, Congress explicitly recognized "the need for uni-
form international interpretation of the Convention."69 Abbott
stressed that the principle of giving weight to the opinions of
our sister signatories "applies with special force" in this con-
text, where "uniform international interpretation of the Con-
vention is part of the Convention's framework."70
The question before the Court in Abbott was whether a
parent's ne exeat right-the right to consent before the other
parent takes the child out of the country-constitutes a "right
of custody," as, under the Hague Convention, a child abducted
in violation of "rights of custody" must be returned to the
child's country of habitual residence, unless certain exceptions
apply.71 In addressing this issue, Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, first analyzed how the Convention defines "rights
of custody," emphasizing that "[t]his uniform, text-based ap-
proach ensures international consistency in interpreting the
Convention" and "forecloses courts from relying on defini-
tions of custody confined by local law usage." 72 After conclud-
ing that the ne exeat rights are "rights of custody" based on the
text, Justice Kennedy found that this interpretation is consis-
tent with the views of the Department of State and the inter-
pretations of other contracting states. He examined decisions
from the United Kingdom, Israel, Austria, South Africa, Ger-
many, Australia, and Scotland, finding "broad acceptance of
the rule that ne exeat rights are rights of custody," while noting
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11603(a)-(b), (d).
69. 42 U.S.C. 11601(b) (3) (B).
70. Abbott, 130 S.Ct. at 1993 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Id. at 1987. Mr. Abbott was a British citizen married to a U.S. citizen.
Their son was born in the United States. The family moved to Chile in 2002
when the son was around seven years old, and the parents separated soon
after. The Chilean courts awarded both Mr. and Mrs. Abbott ne exeat rights
so that neither parent could take the son out of the country without the
other parent's consent. In August 2005, the mother took the son out of
Chile without his father's consent and brought him to Texas, where she filed
for divorce and sought modification of his father's rights. Mr. Abbott
brought suit in federal court in Texas seeking return of his son under the
Hague Convention and ICARA. The District Court and Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the father's ne exeat right did not constitute a right of cus-
tody under the Convention and that the remedy of return therefore was not
authorized. Id. at 1988. The Supreme Court reviewed that determination.
72. Id. at 1991.
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that a more restrictive interpretation by the Canadian Su-
preme Court was not on point and that French courts were
"divided."73 Moreover, "scholars agree[d] that there is an
emerging international consensus that ne exeat rights are rights
of custody, even if that view was not generally formulated when
the Convention was drafted in 1980." Finally, Justice Ken-
nedy found that providing a return remedy for violations of ne
exeat rights is consistent with the Convention's object and pur-
pose.7
The dissent, penned by Justice Stevens and joined, in an
unusual combination, by Justices Thomas and Breyer, rejected
the majority's interpretation of the Convention's text, reason-
ing that this interpretation conflates rights of custody with
rights of access.7 6 The dissent also indicated that it was not
necessary to consider the views of the Department of State or
our sister signatories where "the clear import of the treaty lan-
guage controls the decision," citing Article 32 of the VCLT
and a prior Supreme Court case as support for this assertion.77
The case relied on by the dissent, however, actually states that
"[t] he clear import of treaty language controls unless applica-
tion of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning ef-
fects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signato-
ries."78 This language indicates that even if the text is clear, it is
still important to consider the interpretations of our sister sig-
natories, which is consistent with Article 32 of the VCLT. As
discussed above, Article 32 permits courts to have recourse to
"supplemental means of interpretation" not only when the
text is ambiguous, but also to "confirm" an interpretation
based on the text, object and purpose, or context of the
treaty.79 The dissent in Abbott therefore suggests confusion or
73. Id. at 1993-94.
74. Id. at 1994.
75. Id. at 1995.
76. Id. at 2005-06 (Stevens, j., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2007 & n.11 (internal quotation marks omitted). Article 32 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "[r] ecourse may
be had to supplementary means of interpretation ... when the interpreta-
tion . . . ( a ) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or ( b ) leads to a
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." VCLT, supra note 28, art.
32.
78. See Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. VCLT, supra note 28, art. 32.
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disagreement by at least some members of the Court as to
when it is appropriate to consider the views of other states par-
ties to a treaty.80
Compounding this confusion, the dissent in Abbott raises
questions about how much foreign authority the Court should
consider, what weight to give this foreign authority, and how
uniform the foreign authority must be to influence the Court's
interpretations. While Justice Stevens' dissent acknowledged
that "the views of our sister signatories to the Convention de-
serve special attention," he found that "we should not substi-
tute the judgment of other courts for our own."81 Justice Ste-
vens reasoned that a "handful of foreign decisions ... provide
insufficient reason to depart from [his] understanding of the
meaning of the Convention, an understanding shared by many
U.S. Courts of Appeals."82 He also "fail[ed] to see the interna-
tional consensus . . . among [the] varied decisions from for-
eign courts," finding them, "at best, in equipoise."85 Thus, al-
though the majority considered authority from ten different
countries, the dissent found this number insufficient to be per-
suasive. Moreover, while the majority found consensus among
all but two of the countries (Canada and France), with Cana-
80. Such confusion may be related to the inconsistent decisions issued by
international tribunals regarding the relevance of subsequent practice when
the text of a treaty is unambiguous. For example, some decisions by the Per-
manent Court of International Justice suggest that subsequent practice plays
no role in interpretation when the text is clear, while others have indicated
that subsequent practice can actually modify an unambiguous treaty term.
Compare Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France
(Fr. v. Braz.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 21, at 119 (July 12) (holding that the
way the treaty had been executed could not influence its interpretation if
"there is no ambiguity" in the treaty provision), with Payment of Various Ser-
bian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Serb.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20, at
38-39 (July 12) (considering the possibility that subsequent practice may
have led to a termination of a treaty by way of operation of the principle of
estoppel). Based on his extensive review of decisions by the ICJ and other
international tribunals, Georg Nolte argues that "it would go too far to say
that the meaning of more or less 'clear' terms is largely immune from being
called into question by the subsequent conduct of the parties." NoLTE, supra
note 37, at 16.
81. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S.Ct. 1983, 2008 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
82. Id. at 2008-09 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 2009.
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dian cases simply not being "on point," the dissent found in-
sufficient uniformity to change its own perspective.
Olympic Airways, Sanchez-Llamas, and Abbott all show that
the principle of giving weight to the interpretations of our sis-
ter signatories is well established, but confusion remains about
how to implement this principle. The disagreement between
the majority and dissenting opinions goes beyond the types of
disputes that ordinarily arise when judges construe domestic
cases in ways that support their own views of the case, showing
a lack of consensus around how to select and weigh foreign
authorities in analyzing the interpretations of other con-
tracting parties.
In the absence of more specific guidance from the Su-
preme Court beyond the general principle of "giving weight,"
it is not surprising that lower courts often fail to consider the
interpretations of our sister signatories altogether when inter-
preting an international treaty.8 4 Professor Michael Van Al-
stine calculates that " [o]f the nearly 1400 appellate treaty cases
in the first decade of the twenty-first century, only 12 even
mentioned the views of the courts of 'sister signatories.' "85 For
example, he notes that although the States Parties to the U.N.
84. For examples of cases where appellate courts have considered the
views of our sister signatories, see Chubb Ins. Co. of Europe S.A. v. Menlo
Worldwide Forwarding, Inc., 634 F.3d 1023, 1028 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (not-
ing that the "Warsaw Convention precedent includes the judicial opinions of
our sister signatories" and being "guided by the Ontario Supreme Court of
Canada's ruling that Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention does not apply to
suits brought by one carrier against another"); Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros
Int'l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 399 (3d Cir. 2010) (turning to foreign authority in
analyzing a novel issue arising under the United Nations Convention on the
International Sale of Goods (CISG), only to find that "[c]ourts in foreign
jurisdictions and commentators alike [were] divided over how to proceed in
such a scenario"); In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2009)
(examining a case from England to help determine whether immigration
status could serve as a basis for holding that a child was not "settled" in the
United States for purposes of Article 12 of the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction); Fumes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d
702, 717-18 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing precedents from the United King-
dom, Australia, South Africa, Israel, Canada, and France in analyzing an is-
sue under the Hague Convention and stressing "our reasoning and conclu-
sions are in harmony with the majority of the courts of our sister signatories
that have addressed this treaty issue").
85. Michael P. Van Alstine, Stare Decisis and Foreign Affairs, 61 DuKE L.J.
941, 1022 (2012).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
413
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG), which is a self-executing treaty, have issued over 1200
decisions interpreting the treaty, most of which are readily
available online in English, U.S. courts interpreting the CISG
have generally failed to cite or even acknowledge this body of
relevant case law. 86
Since U.S. courts frequently fail to analyze the views of
our sister signatories even when directly interpreting an inter-
national treaty such as the CISG, it is hardly surprising that
they also fail to engage in this analysis when interpreting an
incorporative domestic statute, such as the Refugee Act of
1980. Indeed, incorporative statutes have generated confusion
in many countries. Richard Gardiner notes that "a particular
problem in those states which transform treaties into domestic
law by legislation is that it has not always been clear whether
the courts will apply their own principles of interpretation,
that is those used for any other domestic law, or whether they
will import the rules of international law as the appropriate
rules for an instrument governed by international law."87 Sec-
tion C shows that the Supreme Court and appellate courts
have implicitly recognized that the rules of treaty interpreta-
tion also apply to incorporative statues, including in asylum
cases, although they often omit the step of examining the
views of our sister signatories in this context.
C. Applying the Rules of Treaty Interpretation to an Incorporative
Statute Such as the Refugee Act
Scholars have already persuasively argued that courts
should construe an incorporative statute according to the gen-
eral rules of treaty interpretation, although they have not fo-
86. Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty jurisprudence
and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEo. L.J. 1885, 1938-40 (2005). Van Alstine
notes that the Fourth Circuit lamented that "[c]ase law interpreting the
[CISG] is rather sparse," despite the plethora of foreign decisions. Id. at
1939 (quoting Schimitz-Werke GmbH & Co. v. Rockland Indus., Inc., 37 Fed
App'x 687, 691 (4th Cir. 2002)). Similarly, the Seventh Circuit ignored over
ninety foreign opinions on article 74 of the CISG, basing its interpretation
instead on Illinois state law, which created conflict between the views of the
United States and some of our sister signatories. See Zapata Hermanos
Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 385, 387-89 (7th Cir.
2002) (relying on Illinois law).
87. GARDINER, supra note 32, at 127.
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cused specifically on the role of foreign authority in this analy-
sis.88 Other contracting parties to the Refugee Protocol have
explicitly applied this principle in interpreting domestic stat-
utes that incorporate the Protocol's key provision. For exam-
ple, in a case that required the High Court of Australia to in-
terpret the term "refugee," ChiefJustice Brennan reasoned:
If a statute transposes the text of a treaty or a provi-
sion of a treaty into the statute so as to enact it as part
of domestic law, the prima facie legislation intention
is that the transposed text should bear the same
meaning in the domestic statute as it bears in the
treaty. To give it that meaning, the rules applicable to
the interpretation of treaties must be applied to the
transposed text and the rules generally applicable to
the interpretation of domestic statutes give way.89
The U.S. Supreme Court has not been so explicit about apply-
ing the rules of treaty interpretation to an incorporative stat-
ute, but it has implicitly followed this principle, at least with
respect to considering the text, context, and object and pur-
pose of a treaty. Yet it rarely applies this principle when it
comes to considering the interpretations of our sister signato-
ries. For example, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court analyzed
the text and negotiating history of Article 1(2) of the Refugee
Convention in construing the statutory phrase "well-founded
fear," which appears in the definition of a "refugee."90 Simi-
larly, in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, the Court analyzed the
text and negotiating history of Article 33(1) of the Refugee
Convention to determine the extraterritorial effect of the non-
refoulement principle set forth in the statute.91 By examining
88. See, e.g., Coyle, supra note 3, at 680 (arguing that courts should con-
strue an incorporative statute as conforming to the incorporated treaty, ap-
plying the canons of treaty interpretation); Goodwin-Gill, supra note 36, at
204-06 (arguing that the rules of treaty interpretation should be applied to
refugee laws derived from the Refugee Convention and Protocol).
89. Applicant A v Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR
225, 230-31. Chief Justice Brennan went on to advocate a holistic, rather
than rigid, approach to treaty interpretation. Id. at 231.
90. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437-40 (1987).
91. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177-87 (1993).
INA § 243(h) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1), as it appeared before April 1, 1997,
provided that "[t]he Attorney General shall not deport or return any
alien . . . to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's
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the text and travaux prdparatoires (drafting history) of the Refu-
gee Convention, the Court applied two of the general rules of
treaty interpretation to cases based on the INA.
Oddly, however, in neither case did the Court examine
the interpretations of other parties to the Protocol, although
both of these decisions were issued after the Court articulated
the principle that the interpretations of our sister signatories
are entitled to considerable weight.92 Moreover, under Article
31(3) (b) of the VCLT, subsequent practice that establishes the
agreement of the parties would be considered, together with
the context, prior to invoking "supplementary means of inter-
pretation" under Article 32, which includes "the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion." By
skipping directly from the text to the preparatory work without
any mention of "subsequent practice," the Court elided an im-
portant element in treaty interpretation.
If this omission was due to the guise of a domestic statute,
the Court lifted that veil a couple years later when faced with
another incorporative statute. In Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v.
M/V Sky Reefer, the Court addressed whether a foreign arbitra-
tion clause in a bill of lading violated the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act (COGSA), which is a domestic statute modeled on an
international treaty, the Brussels Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading.93 The Court
reasoned that none of the 66 States Parties to the treaty has
interpreted it as prohibiting foreign forum selection clauses.
Since COGSA was "the culmination of a multilateral effort to
establish uniform ocean bills of lading," the Court "decline [d]
to interpret our version of [the treaty] in a manner contrary to
every other nation to have addressed this issue."94 By examin-
ing the subsequent practice of other parties to the treaty-a
factor relevant only to treaty interpretation and not to statu-
tory interpretation-Sky Reefer clarified any possible confusion
about what set of rules apply to an incorporative statute.
life or freedom would be threatened in such country . . . ." The analogous
provision now appears at INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
92. That language gained prominence in Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S.
393, 404 (1985).
93. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528,
536-37 (1995).
94. Id. at 537 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Justice Stevens also looked beneath the domestic veneer
of the INA in his concurring opinion in Negusie v. Holder,
which addressed whether a statutory provision that bars peo-
ple who persecuted others from qualifying as "refugees" per-
mits an exception for individuals who acted under coercion or
duress.95 Applying the principles of treaty interpretation to the
statutory persecutor bar, he found that a coercion exception
should exist based on the plain language of the Refugee Con-
vention. He explained that the persecutor bar reflects Article
1(F) of the Refugee Convention, which excludes from the non-
refoulement obligation only those who have "committed a crime
against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity."96
Reasoning that "[w]e do not normally convict individuals of
crimes when their actions are coerced or otherwise involun-
tary," he concluded that the persecutor bar does not apply to
individuals who acted under duress.97 Justice Stevens then
opined that "[o] ther states parties to the Convention and Pro-
tocol likewise read the Convention's exception as limited to
culpable conduct," citing decisions by the Federal Court of Ca-
nada, the U.K Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, the Federal
Court of Australia, and the New Zealand Refugee Status Ap-
peals Authority.98 He stressed that " [w] hen we interpret treaties,
we consider the interpretations of the courts of other nations, and we
should do the same when Congress asks us to interpret a statute in
light of a treaty's language."99
95. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 536-37 (2009) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). The so-called "persecutor bar" provides
that "[t]he term 'refugee' does not include any person who ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2011); see also id.
§ 1158(b)(2) (A) (i) (barring noncitizens who engaged in persecution from
asylum); id. § 1231(b) (3) (B) (i) (barring noncitizens who engaged in perse-
cution from withholding of removal).
96. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 536 (quoting Refugee Convention, supra note 1,
art. 1(F)(a)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 537.
99. Id. (emphasis added). The majority opinion remanded the case to
the BIA to interpret the statutory bar free from a mistaken legal premise,
but, unlike Justice Stevens, the majority did not address whether the BIA
should apply the principles of treaty interpretation in construing the statute.
Id. at 524-25 (majority opinion).
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The U.S. Courts of Appeals have also, at times, drawn on
principles of treaty interpretation when construing parts of the
INA that incorporate the Protocol. The Ninth Circuit has
"often looked to sources of international law for guidance in
applying the asylum and prohibition of deportation provisions
of the Refugee Act."100 In particular, the Ninth Circuit and
other circuit courts have frequently "acknowledged the Hand-
book on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status,
promulgated by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, as a 'significant source of guidance with respect to
the United Nations Protocol."'10 1 For example, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has relied on the drafting language of the Convention and
the UNHCR Handbook in finding that the "particular social
group" ground for refugee status need not be narrowly de-
fined.102 Similarly, in rejecting a narrow interpretation of the
statutory firm resettlement bar, which derives from interna-
tional law and prohibits an individual who has firmly resettled
in another country from obtaining asylum in the United
States, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[t]he international ob-
ligation our nation agreed to share when we enacted the Refu-
gee Convention into law knows no such limits." 10 3
While these appellate cases provide support for applying
the rules of treaty interpretation to the Refugee Act, like the
Supreme Court's decisions in Cardoza-Fonseca and Sale, they fail
to analyze the interpretations of other contracting parties
under either the VCLT or the Supreme Court's principle of
giving "considerable weight" to the interpretation of our sister
signatories. In very rare cases, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have
mentioned foreign authority in analyzing the Refugee Act, but
such references are made in passing, often as a footnote, un-
hinged from a principled approach to treaty interpretation. 104
100. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1575-76 (9th Cir. 1986).
101. Id. at 1576.
102. Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 668 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010).
103. Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 790 (9th Cir. 2005)
104. See, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084,1093 n.6 (9th Cir.
2000) (citing Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Ward [1993] S.C.R. 689) (noting that
the court's formulation of a "particular social group" is "similar to the Su-
preme Court of Canada's definition of the term"). The Ninth Circuit's refer-
ence to the Canadian Supreme Court's decision in Ward reflects the use of
foreign authority to "gild the domestic lily," a phrase that Melissa Waters
coined to describe how the U.S. Supreme Court uses human rights treaties
to support its interpretation of a constitutional provision. Melissa A. Waters,
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For example, in Castellano-Chacon, decided in 2003, before the
BIA introduced its social visibility requirement, the Sixth Cir-
cuit discussed internal versus external factors for defining a
"particular social group" and noted that this question "has di-
vided courts in various countries," contrasting a decision by
the Supreme Court of Canada with a decision by the High
Court of Australia.105 The court did not, however, provide any
additional explanation of whether or how these foreign au-
thorities affected its analysis. By mentioning state practice in
two countries, as well as the UNHCR's guidelines on "member-
ship of a particular social group," the court appears to reach
towards the principles of treaty interpretation, but stops short
of fully embracing them. 06
Just as Justice Stevens' opinion in Negusie highlights the
importance of other contracting parties' interpretations, the
concurring opinion of Judge Reinhardt on the Ninth Circuit
in Delgado v. Holder reaffirms the importance of applying all of
the principles of treaty interpretation to the Refugee Act.107
Delgado involved the meaning of a "particularly serious crime,"
which is not defined by the INA but constitutes a bar to asylum
Getting Beyond the Crossfire Phenomenon: A Militant Moderate's Take on the Role of
Foreign Authority in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 FoRDHlm L. REv. 635, 643
(2008). In this technique, "discussion of international law often seems to be
tacked on as a sort of afterthought to a detailed discussion of domestic law."
Id.
105. Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 547-49 & n. 8 (6th Cir.
2003) (holding that a "particular social group" is composed of individuals
sharing a common, immutable characteristic and that "tattooed youth" do
not constitute such a group). The court contrasted the Supreme Court of
Canada's decision in Ward v. Canada (Minister of Emp't & Immigration),
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 78, which emphasizes innate or immutable character-
istics, with the High Court of Australia's decisions in Applicant A v Minister for
Inmigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, 264 and Minister for Immi-
gration and Multicultural Affairs v Applicant Z (2001) 116 FCR 36, 1 11, which
focus on external perceptions. Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 547 n.8.
106. See Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 548 (refraining "from incorporating
into [the Court's] definition of a 'particular social group' the UNHCR's gui-
dance," but noting that BIA decisions may be becoming increasingly consis-
tent with the UNHCR guidance).
107. See Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1109 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(stressing that a plain text reading would find conviction of a serious crime
not to be a complete bar to relief absent an additional finding that an alien
is dangerous, and that this interpretation is more in line with the intent of
the statute and other countries' interpretations of the Refugee Convention).
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and withholding of removal. 08 The statute simply provides
that an individual is ineligible for these forms of relief if he or
she, "having been convicted by a final judgment of a particu-
larly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of
the United States." 109 The majority recognized that the partic-
ularly serious crime bar reflects Article 33 of the Refugee Con-
vention, which has been incorporated into the Protocol and
provides that the benefit of non-refoulement "may not . . . be
claimed by a refugee ... who, having been convicted by a final
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger
to the community of that country.""10 The majority remanded
the case to the BIA to clarify whether Delgado's three DUI
convictions individually or cumulatively constituted a "particu-
larly serious crime," explaining that the court could not con-
duct meaningful review without understanding the BIA's rea-
soning."' While the majority said nothing about applying the
principles of treaty interpretation in construing the term "par-
ticularly serious crime," Judge Reinhardt noted that if he were
interpreting this term in the first instance, he would endorse
the interpretation that is "most consistent with the intent of
the 1951 Refugee Convention and has been adopted by other coun-
tries in interpreting identical provisions of their refugee laws."'i 2
These cases provide support for applying the same canons
of interpretation to an incorporative statute that one would
apply to the treaty itself, while at the same time highlighting
how courts have often overlooked the principle of giving
weight to the interpretations of our sister signatories as part of
this analysis. Engaging in a comparative analysis is not only re-
quired by Supreme Court precedents, but also has practical
utility. The following section uses a specific example involving
the definition of a "particular social group" to demonstrate
how examining the views of our sister signatories can provide
valuable insights to U.S. courts.
108. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b) (2) (A) (ii) (2011); id. § 1231 (b) (3) (B) (ii).
109. Id. § 1158 (b) (2) (A) (ii); accord id. § 1231(b) (3) (B) (ii).
110. Delgado, 648 F.3d at 1100-01 (majority opinion) (quoting Refugee
Convention, supra note 1, art. 33, 1 2).
111. Id. at 1107-08.
112. Id. at 1109 n.2 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (emphasis added).
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IV. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF APPROACHES
TO INTERPRETING "MEMBERSHIP IN A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP"
An important question currently being litigated in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals concerns the definition of a "particular
social group," which is one of the most ambiguous terms in the
definition of a "refugee." As noted above, a "refugee" is an in-
dividual who has a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or mem-
bership in "a particular social group."113 How to interpret the
"particular social group" ground for asylum has been the sub-
ject of much jurisprudence and scholarly debate, both in the
United States and abroad, yet U.S. courts have rarely consid-
ered our sister signatories' interpretations of this term. 114
In a groundbreaking decision called Matter of Acosta, the
BIA defined a "particular social group" as a group that shares
"a common, immutable characteristic," one that "either is be-
yond the power of an individual to change or is so fundamen-
tal to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be
required to be changed."115 The BIA reached this definition
through the ejusdem generis doctrine, which provides that "gen-
eral words used in an enumeration with specific words should
be construed in a manner consistent with the specific
words."116 Since the other protected grounds-race, religion,
nationality, and political opinion-describe persecution
aimed at an immutable characteristic, one that cannot be
changed or that an individual should not have to change, the
BIA interpreted "membership in a particular social group" in
the same way.117 Applying Acosta's definition, the BIA and ap-
pellate courts have recognized numerous particular social
113. See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, 1 2 (defining "refugee");
INA 101(a) (42) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A).
114. Two cases where U.S. courts did mention foreign authorities in inter-
preting a "particular social group" are Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d
1084, 1093 n.6 (9th Cir. 2000) and Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533,
547-48 & n. 8 (6th Cir. 2003), noted above.
115. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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groups, such as groups based on clan membership, ancestry,
sexual orientation, gender, former occupation, and family."18
In 2006, however; the BIA presented "social visibility" as
an additional factor that should be considered in determining
whether a given group constitutes a "particular social group"
and a couple years later presented "social visibility" as a re-
quirement, not just a factor.119 The BIA purported to rely on
the UNHCR guidelines in taking this step, but actually misap-
plied them.120 While the UNHCR guidelines clearly provide
that a "particular social group" may be based on either an im-
mutable characteristic (often called a "protected characteris-
tic") or social perception, the BIA has imposed both as require-
ments. 121 The new social visibility requirement has resulted in
a circuit split, with the Seventh and Third Circuits rejecting
118. See, e.g., id. ("The shared characteristic might be an innate one such
as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared
past experience such as former military leadership or land ownership."); In
re H-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 1996) (finding that Marehan clan members
in Somalia are a particular social group ("PSG")); In re V-T-S-, 21 1. & N.
Dec. 792 (B.I.A. 1997) (finding that Filipinos of Chinese ancestry are a
PSG); In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990) (finding that
homosexuals in Cuba are a PSG); In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 365
(B.I.A. 1996) (defining "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who
have not had [female genital mutilation], as practiced by that tribe, and who
oppose the practice" as a PSG); In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658 (B.I.A.
1988) (accepting former members of the Salvadoran national police as a
PSG).
119. The BIA introduced the concept of social visibility as a factor in In re
C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956-57 (B.I.A. 2006) ("[W]e have considered as a
relevant factor the extent to which members of a society perceive those with
the characteristic in question as members of a social group."), affd sub nom.
Castillo-Arias v. Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006). The BIA then
turned social visibility from a factor into a requirement in In re A-M-E- &J-G-
U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74-75 (B.I.A. 2007) (discussing the "requisite social
visibility"), affd sub nom. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir.
2007).
120. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956-57 (citing the UNHCR guide-
lines); In re A-M-E- &J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 74-75 (referring to the
same).
121. UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: "MEMBERSHIP
OF A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP" WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 1A(2) OF
THE 1951 CONVENTION AND/OR ITS 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS
OF REFUGEES 11 11, 13 (2002) [hereinafter UNHCR GUIDELINES], available at
http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.html.
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the concept as impossibly vague and unjustified,122 while sev-
eral other circuits have deferred to it or implicitly accepted it
without much analysis.123 The Ninth Circuit, which previously
122. See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding
that the social visibility criterion "makes no sense" and reasoning that the
Board "has found groups to be 'particular social groups' without reference
to social visibility . . . as well as, in this and other cases, refusing to classify
socially invisible groups as particular social groups but without repudiating
the other line of cases"); Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir.
2009) ("Often it is unclear whether the Board is using the term 'social visibil-
ity' in the literal sense or in the 'external criterion' sense, or even whether it
understands the difference"); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 663
F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that the court was "hard-pressed to
understand how the 'social visibility' requirement was satisfied in prior cases
using the Acosta standard"); see also id. at 616 (Hardiman, J., concurring)
("[T]he BIA's analysis comes undone when it states in conclusory fashion
that all of the groups recognized as 'particular social groups' in earlier cases
would meet the 'particularity' and 'social visibility' requirements.").
123. See, e.g., Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2010)
("The social visibility criterion does not signal an abandonment of the com-
mon and immutable characteristic requirement. Rather, it represents an
elaboration of how that requirement operates."); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey,
509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding the BIA's social visibility requirement
"consistent with [the Second Circuit's] reasoning that a 'particular social
group is comprised of individuals who possess some fundamental character-
istic in common which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecu-
tor-or in the eyes of the outside world in general"); Al-Ghorbani v. Holder,
585 F.3d 980, 994-97 (6th Cir. 2009) (implicitly accepting the social visibility
requirement and finding membership in a PSG based both on familial ties
and on opposition to a particular Yemeni social norm); Constanza v. Holder,
647 F.3d 749, 753-54 (8th Cir. 2011) (rejecting persons resistant to gang
membership as a PSG and stating that "a social group requires sufficient
particularity and visibility such that the group is perceived as a cohesive
group by society"); Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 682 (8th Cir. 2012) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (holding that "young males from El Salva-
dor who have been subjected to recruitment by MS-13 and who have re-
jected or resisted membership in the gang based on personal opposition to
the gang" do not comprise a PSG because the group "is not sufficiently nar-
rowed to cover a discrete class of persons who would be perceived as a group
by the rest of society"); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 744-46 (9th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding that the group de-
fined as "young [men] in El Salvador resisting gang violence" lacked visibil-
ity, reasoning that the harassment the petitioner endured was part of gen-
eral unrest and that few people knew of his anti-gang stance); Rivera Bar-
rientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1233 (10th Cir. 2011) (deferring to the
BIA's social visibility requirement but noting that if visibility were inter-
preted in the literal sense, the court "might also find it problematic"); Cas-
tillo-Arias v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1196-99 (11th Cir. 2006) (defer-
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accepted the social visibility requirement, recently reconsid-
ered the issue en banc and complicated the circuit split by find-
ing that the BIA's social visibility requirement does not require
"on-sight" visibility and remanding for the BIA to clarify whose
perspectives are most indicative of society's perceptions.124 In
2012, prior to the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision, the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari in an Eighth Circuit case that
upheld social visibility. 125
The BIA is currently reevaluating its social visibility re-
quirement. In a case remanded to the BIA by the Third Cir-
cuit, Valdiviezo-Galdamez,126 the Department of Homeland Se-
curity (DHS) recognized that "social visibility" should not re-
quire literal visibility and proposed replacing "social visibility"
with a "social distinction" requirement.127 However, since DHS
defined social distinction to mean that the group "must be
perceived by the society in question as distinct," the proposed
term still requires subjective social perception of the group.' 28
In addition to addressing these issues, the BIA must now also
ring to the BIA and reasoning that "the social visibility of informants is dif-
ferent in kind from the particular social groups that have been afforded
protection under the INA").
124. See Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1087-89 (9th Cir.
2013) (en banc). The court reasoned that "a requirement of 'on-sight' visi-
bility would be inconsistent with previous BIA decisions and likely impermis-
sible under the statute." Id. at 1087. According to the Ninth Circuit, the rele-
vant question is "whether the social groups are 'understood by others to con-
stitute social groups."' Id. at 1088 (quoting In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951,
959 (B.I.A. 2006)). Moreover, in requesting clarification from the BIA re-
garding "whose perspectives are most indicative of society's perception of a
particular social group," the court stressed that "[d] ifferent audiences will be
more or less likely to consider a collection of individuals as a social group
depending on their own history, course of interactions with the group, and
the overall context." Id. at 1089 (emphasis added). The court proceeded to
offer its own opinion that "the perception of the persecutors may matter the
most," id., clarifying that this is meant "only to suggest that evidence of per-
ceptions in society as a whole is not the exclusive means of demonstrating
social visibility." Id. at 1090.
125. Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
526 (2012).
126. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 589,
612 (3d Cir. 2011). Oral arguments before the BIA took place in December
2012.
127. Brief of Department of Homeland Security at 7-12, In re Valdiviezo-
Galdamez, No. A097-447-286 (B.I.A. 2012) (on file with author).
128. Id. at 8.
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grapple with the Ninth Circuit's question about whose per-
spective matters.
Given these complicated and divisive developments in our
understanding of a "particular social group," it behooves U.S.
courts to examine how our sister signatories have interpreted
this term and to explore whether they require some form of
social perception. Moving towards a common understanding
of a "particular social group" is critical to ensuring consistent
implementation of the Protocol. The discussion of foreign au-
thorities below shows that interpretations of "particular social
group" are by no means uniform, but important themes and
lessons do emerge that would inform the analysis of U.S.
courts. Since this Article cannot possibly examine the interpre-
tations of even a majority of the 146 parties to the Protocol,
the focus remains on countries that are specially affected by
asylum applications, as well as other countries that have specif-
ically addressed this issue and whose interpretations were ac-
cessible.129
A. Common Law Countries
Common law countries other than the United States-in-
cluding Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, and
New Zealand-do not require social visibility or social percep-
tion to establish a particular social group (PSG). The jurispru-
129. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR STA-
TISTICAL YEARBOOK 2010 42-43 (providing data for a handful of countries).
For the past few years, South Africa has been, by far, the top destination for
asylum-seekers, receiving 180,600 new asylum applications in 2010, about
one-fifth of the 850,200 claims submitted worldwide. Id. at 42. The country
with the second highest number of asylum applications is the United States,
which received about 54,300 new asylum applications in 2010, followed by
France (48,100 claims), Germany (41,300 claims), Sweden (31,800 claims),
Ecuador (31,400 claims), Malaysia (25,600 claims), the United Kingdom
(22,600 claims), Canada (22,500 claims) and Belgium (21,800 claims). Id. at
42-43. Malaysia is not a party to the Protocol, but the other nine countries
are states parties. Among industrialized nations, the top five countries (the
United States, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) re-
ceived 54% of asylum claims. The United States, France, and Germany alone
received 40% of these applications. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES, ASYLUM LEVELs AND TRENDS IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES:
FIRST HALF 2011 at 8-11. The remaining countries, in descending order
from six to ten include Belgium, Canada, Italy, Switzerland, and Austria. Id.
at 11.
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dence of each of these countries is discussed further below.
This section also includes South Africa, which has a hybrid le-
gal system but draws heavily on common law approaches to
defining a PSG.
1. Canada
In Ward v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada ap-
proached defining a PSG by emphasizing that "[u]nderlying
the Convention is the international community's commitment
to the assurance of basic human rights without discrimina-
tion."o30 In finding that Acosta proposed "a good working
rule," the Court explained that Acosta's definition "take [s] into
account the general underlying themes of the defence of
human rights and anti-discrimination that form the basis for
the international refugee protection initiative."s13 The court
then set forth three possible categories for a PSG:
(1) groups defined by an innate or unchangeable
characteristic;
(2) groups whose members voluntarily associate for
reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that
they should not be forced to forsake the association;
and
(3) groups associated by a former voluntary status,
unalterable due to its historical permanence. 3 2
The court explained that the first category would include indi-
viduals persecuted on account of characteristics such as gen-
der, linguistic background, and sexual orientation, while the
second category would include groups such as human rights
activists. The third group "is also relevant to the anti-discrimi-
nation influences, in that one's past is an immutable part of
the person."1 33 Each of these categories focuses on a charac-
teristic that is unchangeable or fundamental to human dignity.
Groups that are excluded are not those lacking social percep-
tion, but those "defined by a characteristic which is change-
130. Canada (Att'y-Gen.) v. Ward, [19931 2 S.C.R. 689, 733.
131. Id. at 739.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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able or from which disassociation is possible, so long as neither
option requires renunciation of basic human rights."13 4
In December 1991, Canada's Immigration and Refugee
Board issued a position paper concerning particular social
groups that provides additional insight.135 The Board set forth
a two-part test very similar to UNHCR's current approach.
First, the adjudicator should determine whether the group
shares "an internal characteristic," which may be innate, im-
mutable, or fundamental to identity or human dignity.1 3 6 If no
such characteristic exists, the adjudicator may still find a social
group based on external perceptions of the group.13 7 The
Board clearly viewed these two standards as alternatives.1 38
Thus, Canada has considered the role of external perceptions,
but has rejected it as a requirement.
2. The United Kingdom
The U.K. House of Lords has also long embraced Acosta's
definition of a particular social group.' 39 In Shah and Islam,
which held, in a seminal analysis of gender-related asylum
claims, that "women in Pakistan" constitute a particular social
group, the Lords not only endorsed Acosta, but rejected addi-
tional requirements outside of the protected characteristic
framework. Specifically, Lord Steyn reasoned that it was "not
134. Id. at 737-38 (quotingJAMEs C. HATHAWAY, THE LAw OF REFUGEE STA-
Tus 161 (1991)). The particular social group at issue in Ward was defined as
"members and former members" of the Irish National Liberation Associa-
tion (INIA). Id. at 744. After determining that Ward's fear was not based on
his status as a fomer member of the INLA and redefining the group as "INLA
members," the Court concluded that this group did not fall within any of the
three categories to be considered a "particular social group." Id. at 744-45.
135. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BoARD OF CANADA, MEMBERSHIP IN A PAR-
TICULAR SocIAL GROUP AS A BAsIS FOR A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR OF PERSECUTION
- Framework of Analysis (1991), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ref
world/docid/3ae6b32510.html; see also Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative
Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular So-
cial Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 505, 540-41 (1993) (discussing the Immi-
gration and Refugee Board's approach).
136. Fullerton, supra note 135, at 540.
137. Id. at 541.
138. Id.
139. See Islam v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [ 1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.)
640-41 (Lord Steyn) (U.K) (consolidated with Regina v. Immigration Appeal
Tribunal ex parte Shah) (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 211 (B.I.A.
1985)).
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justified . .. to introduce .. . an additional restriction of cohe-
siveness," because "[t]o do so would be contrary to the ejus-
dem generis approach so cogently stated in [Acosta]."140 Lord
Hoffmann likewise endorsed Acosta, rejecting an additional el-
ement of cohesiveness that was "irrelevant" to the principle of
non-discrimination and did not apply to any of the other pro-
tected grounds. 1 4 1 The same reasoning supports rejecting an
element of social visibility.
In fact, in 2006, the House of Lords did consider and re-
ject the notion of an additional "social recognition" require-
ment analogous to the BIA's social visibility test.142 This issue
arose in the context of interpreting the EU Council's Qualifi-
cation Directive, which was adopted on April 29, 2004 as part
of the process for establishing a Common European Asylum
System.14 3 In order to promote a shared understanding of
"membership in a particular social group," Article 10(1) (d) of
the Qualification Directive provides, in relevant part:
(d) a group shall be considered to form a particular so-
cial group where in particular:
(i) members of that group share an innate character-
istic, or a common background that cannot be
changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so
fundamental to identity or conscience that a person
should not be forced to renounce it, and
(ii) that group has a distinct identity in the relevant
country, because it is perceived as being different by
the surrounding society;144
140. Id. at 643.
141. Id. at 651 (Lord Hoffmann).
142. See K v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2006] W.L.R. 733 (H.L.),
[2006] UKHL 46 (U.K.).
143. See Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum
Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or
Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need Interna-
tional Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, art. 10(1) (d),
2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EU) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Qualification Di-
rective].
144. Id. (emphasis and roman numerals added). This Directive was recast
in December 2011, but the relevant language quoted here remained the
same. See Council Directive 2011/95/EU, art. 10(1) (d), 2011 O.J. (L 337) 9
(EU).
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The implementing regulation uses the same language except
that it replaces "in particulaf with the words "for example."14 5
While the conjunction "and" between the two tests may sug-
gest cumulative requirements, the modifying phrases "in partic-
ulai' and "for example" indicate that the protected characteris-
tic and social perception approaches represent two ways to es-
tablish a "particular social group," rather than dual
requirements.
This is precisely how the House of Lords interpreted the
Qualification Directive in the combined appeals of Fornah and
K, where the Lords held that "uninitiated, intact women" in
Sierra Leone (i.e., women who had not undergone female
genital mutilation) and members of a family could constitute
particular social groups. 1 4 6 Lord Bingham reasoned that if Ar-
ticle 10(d) "were interpreted as meaning that a social group
should only be recognised as a particular social group for pur-
poses of the Convention if it satisfies the criteria in both of
sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii), then . . . it propounds a test more
stringent than is warranted by international authority."147 He there-
fore supported UNHCR's view that "the criteria in sub-paragraphs
(i) and (ii) should be treated as alternatives, providing for recognition
of a particular social group where either criterion is met and not requir-
ing that both be met."1 4 8 His decision stressed that UNHCR's in-
terpretation was "clearly based on a careful reading of the in-
ternational authorities" and "provide [s] a very accurate and
helpful distillation of their effect."149 Similarly, Lord Hope of
Craighead found that "it would be a mistake to insist that [social]
recognition is always necessary."150 Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-
Heywood agreed, entirely accepting UNHCR's definition and
concluding that the Qualification Directive "will .. . have to be
145. The Refugee or Persons in Need of International Protection (Qualifi-
cation) Regulations, 2006, S.I. 2006/2525, art. 6, 1 1(d), available at http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47a7081cO.html.
146. K. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2006] W.L.R. at 767-68, 11
74-75. Fornah (the applicant in the conjoined appeal) was a Sierra Leonean
woman who feared FGM if sent home. Id, 11 4-5. K was an Iranian woman
who feared persecution as a member of her husband's family because the
Iranian regime had persecuted him and then turned on her. Id., 1 2.
147. Id., 1 16 (Lord Bingham) (emphasis added).
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Id., 15 (emphasis added).
150. Id., 1 46 (Lord Hope) (emphasis added).
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interpreted consistently with this definition." 15' Thus, the
House of Lords has squarely rejected any additional require-
ment of social recognition and visibility. While lower tribunals
responsible for asylum determinations do sometimes still im-
pose social perception as an additional requirement, the
House of Lords' interpretation represents the view of the high-
est court. 152
3. Ireland
In interpreting Ireland's 1996 Refugee Act, "the Irish
courts have consistently drawn upon, and accepted as persua-
sive, leading cases on the concept of a particular social group,
from the USA, Canada, and the UK." 53 Specifically, the Irish
courts have followed the protected characteristic approach set
forth in Acosta, Ward, and Shah and Islam, discussed above.' 5 4
The regulations adopted by Ireland in 2006 to implement the
European Union Qualification Directive specifically provide:
A group shall be considered a particular social group
where, in particular: (i) members of that group share
an innate characteristic, or a common background
that can't be changed, or share a characteristic or be-
lief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience
that a person should not be forced to renounce it, or
(ii) that group has a distinct identity in the relevant
country, because it is perceived as being different by
the surrounding society. . .55
In this respect, Ireland's interpretation of a "particular social
group" and the Qualification Directive is consistent with that
151. Id., 1 118 (Lord Brown).
152. See, e.g., SB v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2008] UKAIT
00002, 69 (applying protected characteristic and social perception as dual
requirements). The UKBA asylum instructions also interpret both ap-
proaches as cumulative. HANA CHEIKH ALI, CHRISTEL QUERTON & ELODIE
SouLARD, GENDER-RELATED ASYLUM CLAIMS IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE ANAL-
YSIS OF LAw, POLICIES AND PRACTICE FOCUSING ON WOMEN IN NINE EU MEM-
BER STATES 63-64 (2012), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdf
id/4fc74d342.pdf.
153. Siobhdn Mullally, Speaking across Borders: The Limits and Potential of
Transnational Dialogue on Refugee Law in Ireland, in THE LIMITS OF TRANSNA-
TIONAL LAw, supra note 36, at 150, 164.
154. Id. at 164 n.70.
155. European Communities (Eligibility for Protection) Regulations,
2006, S.I. 2006/518, art. 10, 1(d) (Ir.) (emphasis added).
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of the United Kingdom, presenting the protected characteris-
tic and social perception approaches as alternatives, rather
than dual requirements.
4. Australia
Of the common law countries, only Australia has empha-
sized social perception in analyzing claims based on member-
ship of a protected social group, but it has clarified that social
perception is not a requirement. In Applicant A, which held
that Chinese parents with one child who do not accept the
reproductive limitations placed upon them or who are forcibly
sterilized do not constitute a "particular social group," the
High Court of Australia defined this term based on the ordi-
nary meaning of the words, referring primarily to an English
dictionary.15 6 Justice Dawson, who elaborated on this ap-
proach, stressed that the phrase "should be given a broad in-
terpretation to encompass all those who fall fairly within its
language and should be construed in light of the context in
which it appears."157 Yet he still rejected the proposed social
group, reasoning, in part, that "[it] is not an accurate response
to say that the government itself perceives such persons to be a
group." 15 8
Justice McHugh's opinion in Applicant A focused even
more on the "external perceptions of the group," but even he
was not concerned with literal visibility.15 9 In fact, he specifi-
cally noted that a particular social group could exist even
"though the distinguishing features of the group do not have a
public face," as long as the public was "aware of the character-
istics or attributes that . . . unite and identify the group."'60
Justice McHugh confirmed Acosta's idea that the members of a
particular social group must share "some characteristic, attri-
bute, activity, belief, interest or goal that unites them," but also
156. Applicant A v Minister of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1997] HCA 4,
190 CLR 225, 241 & n.57 (Dawson J.) (Austl.); see also MICHELLE FOSTER, THE
'GROUND WITH THE LEAST CLARITY': A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF JURISPRUDEN-
TIAL DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO 'MEMBERSHIP OF A PARTICULAR SOCIAL
GROUP' 9 (UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Series, 2012) (discussing the
decision in Applicant A).
157. Applicant A, 190 CLR at 241.
158. Id. at 243.
159. Id. at 264 (McHugh J).
160. Id. at 265.
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opined that " [i]f the group is perceived by people in the relevant
country as a particular social group, it will usually but not always be
the case that they dre members of such a group."161 The Full Court of
the Federal Court of Australia later interpreted Justice Mc-
Hugh's opinion in Applicant A as requiring not only a common
characteristic, but also "recognition within the society that the col-
lection of individuals is a group that is set apart from the rest
of the community." 162
The High Court, however, subsequently clarified its inter-
pretation of a particular social group in Applicant S, explicitly
holding that social perception is "not a requirement," although it
may be relevant to the analysis.163 The High Court explained
that Justice McHugh's opinion in Applicant A merely ex-
pounded on the idea that a particular social group must be
distinguished from society at large, and that "[o]ne way in
which this may be determined is by examining whether the
society in question perceives there to be such a group."164
Other evidence relevant to distinguishing the group could be
"cultural, social, religious, and legal factors" that reflect the
position of group members in the society.165 The High Court
remanded the case for the lower court to address whether
"young able-bodied men" in Afghanistan constitute a particu-
lar social group under this clarified legal standard.166
In reaching this decision, the High Court recognized that
making social perception a requirement could seriously distort
the analysis, as "[c] ommunities may deny the existence of par-
ticular social groups because the common attribute shared by
members of the group offends religious or cultural beliefs
held by a majority of the community."' 67 "Those communities
do not recognize or perceive the existence of the particular
social group, but it cannot be said that the particular social
161. Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
162. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Zamora (1998) 85 FCR
458, 464 (Austl.) (emphasis added).
163. Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2004]
HCA 25, 116 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow & Kirby JJ) (emphasis added).
164. Id. 27 (emphasis added).
165. Id. 30 (quoting Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v
Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1, 28 1 83 (Austl.)); see also FOSTER, supra note 156,
at 10-11 (discussing Applicant S).
166. Applicant S, [2004] HCA at 25, 1 50-51.
167. Id. 34.
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group does not exist."16 8 Consequently, the Court stressed that
the factors that distinguish a group from the rest of society
may be "ascertained objectively from a third-party perspec-
tive."169 For example, a decision-maker may determine that a
group is distinct based on "country information," rather than
trying to ascertain the subjective perceptions of people within
that country. 170 Justice McHugh's opinion in Applicant S con-
firms, "it is not necessary that a 'particular social group' be
recognized as a group that is set apart from the rest of soci-
ety."171 Indeed, he found that "[t]o require evidence of recog-
nition or perception by the society . . . is to impose a condition
that the Convention does not require."'72 Thus, the High Court of
Australia, which spawned the idea of social perception, has
since rejected it as a requirement.
5. New Zealand
New Zealand's Refugee Status Appeals Authority
("RSAA") has firmly adopted Acosta's protected characteristic
approach.1 73 The RSAA embraced "[t]he Acosta ejusdem
generis interpretation of 'particular social group"' because it
"firmly weds the social group category to the principle of the
avoidance of civil and political discrimination."17 4 In a case
called Re GJthat applied the protected characteristic approach
to find that homosexuals in Iran comprise a particular social
group, the RSAA also rejected social perception as an alterna-
tive formulation, reasoning that "by making societal attitudes
determinative of the existence of the social group, virtually any
group of persons in a society perceived as a group could be
said to be a particular social group."' 75 Thus, both Australia
and New Zealand view the social perception approach as per-
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. 35.
171. Id. 61 (McHugh J) (emphasis added).
172. Id. 68 (second emphasis added).
173. Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, Re GJ27-28 (N.Z. Refugee Status Appeals
Authority, Aug. 30, 1995), available at http://www.refugee.org.nz/rsaa/text/
docs/1312-93.htm.
174. Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99 1 104 (N.Z. Refugee Status Appeals Au-
thority, Aug. 16, 2000) (citing Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 56-57), available
at http://www.refugee.org.nz/Casesearch/Fulltext/71427-99.htm.
175. Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 60.
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mitting a broad category of groups to qualify, but Australia re-
gards this flexibility as a positive development whereas New
Zealand does not. In practice, however, the social perception
approach often operates as a restrictive measure that can dis-
qualify groups with a protective characteristic, as discussed fur-
ther in Parts B and C below.
6. South Africa
South Africa has a hybrid legal system that combines as-
pects of English common law, Dutch civil law, and African cus-
tomary law, but its interpretation of "particular social group"
appears to draw heavily from common law countries. In a re-
ported decision, the High Court of South Africa (Transvaal
Provincial Division) endorsed the three-part definition of a
particular social group set forth by the Canadian Supreme
Court in Ward, which, as discussed above, does not mention
social perception.1 7 6 South Africa's Refugee Appeal Board has
also applied the protected characteristic approach embraced
by Acosta, Shah and Islam, and Re GJ discussed above, in finding
that homosexuals constitute a particular social group. 77
B. Civil Law Countries
While civil law countries have not historically engaged in
as much interpretation of the meaning of a "particular social
group" as common law countries, legislation and judicial deci-
sions in European countries have increasingly addressed the
definition of this term since the introduction of the Qualifica-
tion Directive. Legislation or practice in Hungary, 78 Italy,' 7 9
176. See Fang v. Refugee Appeal Board 2007 (2) SA 447 (T) at 460 (S. Mr.),
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2006/ 1 0 1 .pdf.
177. See U v. Refugee Status Determination Officer (S. Mr. Refugee Appeal
Board, Dec. 1, 2002), available at http://www.refugeecaselaw.org/redirect
pdf.aspx?caseid=1032.
178. GENDER-RELATED ASYLUM CLAJMS IN EUROPE, supra note 152, at 70
(stating that Hungary is an "example of good practice as [its] national legis-
lation clearly provides for an alternative approach to the two PSG limbs"); see
also FOSTER, supra note 156, at 17 n.98 (quoting the Hungarian legislation,
Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum, § 64, 11, which uses the conjunction "or"
between the two criteria).
179. GENDER-REILATED AsyLum CuAMS IN EUROPE, supra note 152, at 70.
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Luxembourg,180 Romania,18 Sweden,182 Austria, 183 and Portu-
gal1 84 requires only one of the criteria from article 10 of the Qual-
ification Directive to establish a particular social group. The
Netherlands has also indicated that either criterion is suffi-
cient.18 5 Likewise, Greece indicates that one of the criteria is
sufficient. 8 6 Switzerland appears to follow the protected char-
acteristic approach, as "[t] he concept of a social group is
based on the existence of common internal characteristics that
constitute a reason for illegal persecution."1 8 7 At least ten civil
law countries therefore do not require social perception to es-
tablish a particular social group. According to the European
Council on Refugees and Exile (ECRE), a pan-European alli-
ance of nongovernmental organizations that assist refugees,
this interpretation is "in keeping with the majority view of in-
ternational law."1 88
Among the civil law countries that require both a pro-
tected characteristic and social perception, France is a leading
authority and Germany has recently moved in this direction,
180. EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND ExiLs (ECRE), THE IMPACT OF
THE EU QUAUFICATION DIRECTIvE ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 155-56
(2008) [hereinafter ECRE STUDY], available at http://cmr.jur.ru.nl/cmr/
docs/ECRE-QD-study-full.pdf.
181. Id. at 156. The Romanian legislation incorporates the exact language
of article 10 (1) (d), which is interpreted in practice as setting forth two alter-
native approaches. GENDER-RELATED ASYLUM CLAIMS IN EUROPE, supra note
152, at 61.
182. ECRE STUDY, supra note 180, at 156; see also GENDER-RELATED ASYLUM
CLAIMS IN EUROPE, supra note 152, at 62 (stating that Sweden considers the
approaches as alternatives).
183. ECRE STUDY, supra note 180, at 20 (stating that Austria applies the
approaches as alternatives in jurisprudence). Legislation in Austria refers to
the Qualification Directive without specifically mentioning the definition of
a particular social group. FOSTER, supra note 156, at 17 n.99. In response to
the ECRE survey, Austria explained that its jurisprudence had required only
one criterion and it was unclear whether or not this interpretation would
change. ECRE STUDY, supra note 180, at 155.
184. ECRE STUDY, supra note 180, at 20 (stating that Portugal applies the
approaches as alternatives in jurisprudence).
185. Id. at 156. Legislation in the Netherlands simply mirrors the Qualifi-
cation Directive without specifically addressing the definition of a PSG. See
FOSTER, supra note 156, at 17 n.99.
186. ECRE STUDY, supra note 180, at 155.
187. Klaus Hullmann, Switzerland, in WHO IS A REFUGEE? A COMPARATIVE
CASE LAw STUDY 111, 156 (Jean-Yves Carlier et al. eds., 1997).
188. ECRE STUDY, supra note 180, at 20.
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although their decisions reflect inconsistencies in applying this
approach, as discussed further below. Norway and Finland
have also enacted legislation requiring a particular social
group to have a protected characteristic and be perceived by
society, but Norway confusingly indicates that either criterion
is sufficient in its response to the ECRE survey.189 Authorities
in Malta state that both criteria must be satisfied, but the legis-
lation provides that "a particular social group might include a
group based on a common characteristic or sexual orienta-
tion," without specifically mentioning social perception. 190
Other countries, such as Belgium and possibly Spain, purport
to require both criteria but in practice apply a flexible ap-
proach where either criterion will suffice.191
While the ECRE study suggests that Slovakia, Poland, Slo-
venia, and Czech Republic also require both criteria to be met,
a closer examination of three of these countries calls this cate-
gorization into question.192 In Poland, "various decisions [of]
both the Office for Aliens and the Refugee Board were not
consistent in the interpretation of the particular social group
concept."193 Slovenia indicates that, before the Directive, "this
aspect was not included in the assessment of 'particular social
group,"' so the actual practice remains to be seen. Similarly,
"the core inquiry [about whether to apply] the 'protected
characteristics' or 'social perception' approach, is completely
untouched in Czech Republic," which has not yet adopted any
guidelines on "membership of a particular social group."19 4
189. FOSTER, supra note 156, at 18-19 & n.101 (citing the Act of 15 May
2008 on the Entry of Foreign Nationals into the Kingdom of Norway and
their Stay in the Realm (Immigration Act), § 30(d)); id. at 18 n.100 (citing
the Finnish Aliens Act, 301/2004, amendments up to 1152/2010 included,
§ 87b (323/200), 1 3); see also ECRE STUDY, supra note 180, at 155-56.
190. GENDER-RELATED ASYLUM CLAIMS IN EUROPE, supra note 152, at 61.
191. See ECRE STUDY, supra note 180, at 155 (indicating that Belgium's
approach is "flexible" in practice); see also FOSTER, supra note 156, at 34 &
n.201 (suggesting that Spain appears to assume that the Qualification Direc-
tive requires the satisfaction of both criteria, but "it is not clear that this has
or will result in a more restrictive approach in practice"); id. at 35-36 (stat-
ing that Belgium applies the test flexibly).
192. See ECRE STUDY, supra note 180, at 155-56.
193. Id. at 149-50; see also id. at 20 (noting Polish decisions are inconsis-
tent).
194. David Kosar, Persecution on the Grounds of Membership of a Particular So-
cial Group 94 (2004), available at http://aa.ecn.cz/img-upload/f76c21488a0
48c95bc0a5f1 2deecel 53/2004_refugeelaw.pdf.
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Thus, of the European civil law countries mentioned above
that purport to require both a protected characteristic and so-
cial perception, two (France and Germany) are inconsistent in
their practice, at least one (Belgium) shows flexibility in prac-
tice, and at least three others (Poland, Slovenia, and Czech
Republic) have not yet developed much, if any, practice in in-
terpreting the PSG ground.195
The discussion below examines decisions from Germany,
France, and Belgium in greater detail, showing how the inter-
pretation of a "particular social group" has evolved in these
countries and how the approaches are inconsistently or flexi-
bly applied in practice.
1. Germany
Prior to the issuance of the EU Qualification Directive in
2004, German jurisprudence on the particular social group
ground of the Refugee Convention was "sparse" with "no es-
tablished interpretation."I 96 Older decisions indicate that the
German courts focused on external perceptions in some cases
and immutable characteristics in others, even when examining
the very same issue, without any attempt to synthesize these
different approaches.19 7 For example, one case from 1983 fo-
cused on popular perception and the perspective of an objec-
tive observer in determining that a homosexual from Iran be-
195. Bulgaria is another country that is impossible to categorize at this
point in time, as it has enacted legislation that simply refers to the Qualifica-
tion Directive, without having ever interpreted the meaning of a "particular
social group." See ECRE STUDY, supra note 180, at 156 (noting the lack of a
definition); FOSTER, supra note 156, at 17 n.99 (quoting the Bulgarian legis-
lation as stating that "' [r]ace, religion, nationality, particular social group or
political opinion or belief' are terms pursuant to the Convention on the
status of refugees of 1951 and to Art. 10, par. 1 of the [Qualification Direc-
tive]").
196. Paul Tiedemann, Protection against Persecution Because of "Membership of
a Particular Social Group" in German Law, in THE CHANGING NATURE OF PERSE-
CUTION 340, 341, 345 (Int'l Assoc. of Refugee L. Judges 4th Conference,
2000), available at http://www.iarlj.org/general/images/stories/WorldCon
ferences/4-2000-bern.pdf.
197. See Fullerton, supra note 135, at 531-35 (reviewing German judicial
decisions).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
437
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
longed to a PSG based on his sexual orientation. 98 Yet two
subsequent decisions in 1988 and 1993 focused on whether
the asylum seeker's homosexuality was an immutable charac-
teristic.199
While these decisions suggest the absence of a clear ana-
lytical approach for determining whether a group constitutes a
"particular social group," scholars suggest that "the jurispru-
dence usually concentrated on the 'unchangeable characteris-
tic.' "200 In fact, Germany has repeatedly applied the principle
that a "particular social group" may be based on gender to
groups that are often not socially visible, such as in cases in-
volving female genital mutilation, forced marriage, honor
crimes, and homosexuality.201 Moreover, Judge Tiedemann
has explained that "the right of asylum will always be granted
in accordance with article 16a GG [of the German Constitu-
tion], if somebody is persecuted because of a personal charac-
teristic which is unalterable for him ... comparable to that of
race or nationality (or religious belief) "22
Since the introduction of the Qualification Directive,
however, Germany has indicated that it requires both a pro-
tected characteristic and social perception to establish a partic-
198. Id. at 534 (citing Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden [VG] [Wiesbaden
Administrative Court] Judgment of Apr. 26, 1983, No. IV/I E 06244/81
(Ger.)).
199. In 1988, the Federal Administrative Court held that "homosexuality
can be considered as an attribute that could be ground[s] for asylum, if it is
an irreversible personal characteristic." See Cases and Comments, IJRL/004, 1 INT'L
J. REFUGEE L. 110 (1989) (providing an English summary of the court's deci-
sion); see also Tiedemann, supra note 196, at 343 (discussing the same case).
Similarly, in 1993, the High Administrative Court ruled that "homosexuality
as a ground for asylum is relevant only in cases of non-reversibility." HtLtrNE
LAMBERT, SEEKING ASYLUM: COMPARATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE IN SELECTED Eu-
ROPEAN COUNTRIES 82-83 (1995) (internal quotations omitted); see also Refiu-
gee Appeal No. 1312/93, Re GJ 41 (N.Z. Refugee Status Appeals Authority,
Aug. 30, 1995), available at http://www.refugee.org.nz/rsaa/text/docs/
1312-93.htm (discussing the German cases mentioned here).
200. See Foster, supra note 156, at 24 & n.132 (emphasis added) (citing E.
Hollman, Presentation: Die Qualifikationsrichtline (Nov. 25, 2005).
201. ECRE STUDY, supra note 180, at 148-49. Comparatively, in rejecting
the social visibility requirement, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the BIA
had found groups to be "particular social groups" without reference to social
visibility in the past, citing cases involving female genital mutilation and ho-
mosexuality. See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2009).
202. See Tiedemann, supra note 196, at 343.
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ular social group. 203 The application instructions published by
the Federal Ministry of the Interior provide that a particular
social group must have "a distinct identity within the society of
the country of origin," such as "where a group gets discrimi-
nated by the surrounding society."204 This language is some-
what ambiguous as to whether Germany requires subjective so-
cial perception or simply an objective determination that the
group is set apart from the rest of society, like Australia. By
indicating that evidence of discrimination would show a "dis-
tinct identity," the instructions seem to suggest that the deter-
mination is objective and can be based on country conditions
reports.
A study that analyzed eighty German decisions found that
"the majority" of decisions interpreted Article 10(1) (d) of the
Qualification Directive as requiring both a protected charac-
teristic and social perception. 205 Thus, while the trend may be
towards dual requirements, inconsistent approaches still exist
in practice. Moreover, among courts that have required both
criteria, their reasoning appears inconsistent. For example, a
decision by the Wiesbaden Administrative Court explained
that the language of the Qualification Directive-specifically
the phrase "in particular"-allows for other ways to establish a
particular social group, but satisfying only one of the two crite-
ria would not "express a similar intensity of description" and is
therefore insufficient. 206 A decision by the Higher Administra-
tive Court of Schleswig-Holstein, on the other hand, found
that the UNHCR Guidelines require group members to be per-
203. See ECRE STUDY, supra note 180, at 148 (stating that the Federal Min-
istry of Interior has interpreted Art. 10(1) (d) of the Minimum Qualification
Directive to require both criteria, according to guidelines issued on Oct. 13,
2006); see also FOSTER, supra note 156, at 24-25 (noting that Germany has
required both criteria since the adoption of the Qualification Directive).
204. See FoSTER, supra note 156, at 25 (citing Hinweise des Bundesin-
nenministeriums zur Anwendung der Richtlinie 2004/83/EG des Rates vom
29 April 2004 fiber Mindestnormen ffir die Annerkennung und den Status
von Drittstaatsangeh6rigen oder Staatenlosen als Fluchtlinge oder als Per-
sonen, die anderweitig internationalen Schutz ben6tigen, und fiber den In-
halt des zu gewthrenden Schutzes, [Remarks by the Interior Ministry on the
Application of Council Directive 2004/83/EG] Oct. 13, 2006).
205. Id. at 25.
206. See id. at 26 (citing Verwaltungsgericht [VG] Wiesbaden [Wiesbaden
Administrative Court] Mar. 14, 2011, 3 K 1465/09.WI.A).
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ceived as different, misreading these Guidelines in the same
manner as the BIA.20 7
The Higher Administrative Court's decision also seems to
interpret social perception as requiring society as a whole to
literally see the characteristic that defines the group. In that
case, the court found that family members could not consti-
tute a particular social group because "a family is not . . .
clearly distinguishable from the rest of society." 208 The court
went on to explain that in some situations, family membership
may be "actually visible," such as when the members belong to
"a regional tribal group that has a special significance and acts
as identification."2 0 9 The case before the court, however, in-
volved an Iraqi man who feared being killed by the relatives of
two slain men as a vendetta against his family.210 Reasoning
that the applicant "will be perceived only by [the relatives of
the slain men], not by other citizens .. . as 'distinctive' in Iraq"
and that "[t]he distinction . . . arises . .. only through the act
of persecution," the court concluded that he was not eligible
for asylum.2 11
This German decision not only suggests that social per-
ception requires literal visibility, but also indicates that it is in-
sufficient for the feared persecutors to perceive the group
members as distinct. Rather, society as a whole must perceive
the group members as being different. This interpretation by
the German court indicates that the questions raised by the
Ninth Circuit regarding whether the BIA's test requires literal
visibility and what constitutes the relevant community for the
analysis are indeed important issues that require clarification
and could have a critical impact on the outcome of a case. 212
In sum, German legislation now requires both a protected
207. See FOSTER, supra note 156, at 26-27 & n.140) (citing Obervenal-
tungsgericht [OVG] Schleswig-Holstein [Schleswig-Holstein Higher Admin-
istrative Court] Jan. 27, 2006, 1 L B 22/05).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2013)
(en banc) ("Neither we nor the BIA has clearly specified whose perspectives
are most indicative of society's perception of a particular social group: the
Petitioner herself? Her social circle? Her native country as a whole? The
United States? The global community?"). This en bane decision adopts the
questions raised earlier by Judge Bea and Judge Ripple in their concurring
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characteristic and social perception, but inconsistencies re-
main in practice. Moreover, at least some courts seem to inter-
pret social perception as requiring the group members' defin-
ing characteristic to be literally visible to the society as a whole.
2. France
Like German jurisprudence, the decisions of La Commis-
sion des Recours des Refugies (CRR), the appeal body respon-
sible for refugee status determinations in France, generally in-
volve limited legal reasoning.213 A 1997 case called Ourbih, in-
volving an Algerian transsexual, presented a more analytic
definition of a "particular social group." There, the Conseil
d'Etat, which is the highest administrative court, rejected the
CRR's decision to deny asylum, reasoning that the CRR had
not properly examined the evidence to determine whether
transsexuals were regarded as a social group in Algeria "by rea-
son of the common characteristics which define them in the eyes of the
authorities and of society."214 The analysis in Ourbih "referred to
German and US jurisprudence as well as Anglo-Saxon aca-
demic writing."215
On its face, the definition in Ourbih appears to combine
both the protected characteristic and social perception ap-
proach. When the case was returned to the CRR for reconsid-
eration, however, the CRR held on May 15, 1998 that
"transsexuals in Algeria could constitute a particular social
group because of a common characteristic that set them apart and
exposed them to persecution that was tolerated by the authori-
opinion in Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 449 F. App'x 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2011),
rev'd, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Bea, J., concurring).
213. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Protected Characteristics and Social Perceptions:
An Analysis of the Meaning of 'Membership of a Particular Social Group', in REFu-
GEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS
ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 263, 280 (Erica Feller, Volker TfIrk & Fran-
ces Nicholson eds., 2003) ("The French jurisprudence does not include de-
tailed analyses of membership of a particular social group.").
214. Id. at 281 (translating and quoting Conseil d'Etat (CE) decision No.
171858, Jun. 23, 1997 (Fr.), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3ae6b67cl4.html).
215. H1ne Lambert & Janine Silga, Transnational Refugee Law in the
French Courts: Deliberate or Compelled Change in judicial Attitudes?, in THE LIMITS
or TRANSNATIONAL LAw, supra note 33, at 35, 46.
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ties in Algeria."216 A report prepared by Rodger Haines for the
International Association of Refugee Law Judges explained
that the decision in Ourbih "liberalized the interpretation [of
'a particular social group'], with only limited requirements be-
yond the persecution: a group of common characteristics setting it
apart from the rest of society."2 17 These interpretations of Ourbih
create ambiguity about whether the decision actually required
subjective social perception or simply some type of distinction
(being "set apart") that could be objectively established.
In 1999, however, the CRR applied Ourbih to a seminal
case on sexual orientation called Djellal and found that refu-
gee protection is limited to "persons who claim their homosex-
uality and manifest it in their external behaviour."218 This interpre-
tation appears to require literal visibility, which even the De-
partment of Homeland Security has rejected in the United
States. Various scholars have confirmed that French jurispru-
dence requires outward manifestation of the characteristic
that defines the social group. 219 In other words, the decision
in Dejllal indicates that it is not enough for a gay asylum-seeker
in France to show that his society of origin recognizes homo-
sexuals as a group, but he must also somehow act gay to estab-
lish membership in a particular social group.
During the past decade, however, the CRR has also been
influenced by decisions from Canada and the United King-
216. Id. (citing Commission des Recours des Rdfugi6s, Sections R6unies
(CRR) (SR) decision No. 269875, May 15, 1998 (Fr.)).
217. RODGER HAINES, INTERIM REPORT ON MEMBERSHIP OF A PARTICULAR
SocIAL. GROUP app. 1 (2008) (emphasis added), available at http://www.refu
gee.org.nz/Reference/larljpaper.htm.
218. FOSTER, supra note 156, at 11 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
219. See, e.g., id. at 11 (interpreting Djellal as requiring "not only that the
characteristic be identifiable, and define the group in the eyes of the rele-
vant society, but that those members of the group seeking protection mani-
fest such attributes in their external behaviour"); Jean Yves Carlier, Droit
d'Asile et des Refugis: De la Protection aux Droits, 332 RECUEIL DES CouRS 9, 213
(2008) (concluding that French jurisprudence requires "an affirmative
stance of protest and social transgression on the part of the claimant, with-
out which he/she will not be perceived as a member of a social group by
society" (author's translation)); DENIS ALLAND & CATHERINE TEITGEN-COLLY,
TRAITt DU DROIT DE L'ASILE 427-28 (2002) (describing France's "exterior
requirement"); Roger Errera, The Concept of Membership of a Particular Social
Group, in Common Values in International Law 133, 145-49 (Pierre-Marie
Dupuy et al. eds., 2006) (discussing French law requiring the relevant com-
mon characteristics to be seen by "society at large").
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dom in finding that former prostitutes comprise a particular
social group based on a former immutable status,220 and that
women who refuse to be forcibly married constitute a group
based on their common characteristics.221 Neither former
prostitutes nor women who resist forced marriages have char-
acteristics that are socially visible (certainly not literally visi-
ble), but they do share immutable characteristics. These cases
suggest that French jurisprudence has not emphasized social
perception in all situations.
Yet more recent decisions have drawn on concepts of so-
cial perception or social recognition to restrict prior interpre-
tations in gender-related claims. For example, although
France recognized that women or parents who refuse female
genital mutilation (FGM) constitute a particular social group
in 2001, it limited this interpretation in 2009, "ruling that only
individuals who expressed their opposition to FGM, and con-
sequently transgressed social norms, could be identified as
members of a PSG."2 2 2 Similarly, although the CRR recog-
nized women who refused to be forcibly married as a particu-
lar social group in 2004 and 2005, the Conseil d'Etat ruled in
2009 that a woman facing forced marriage in the rural parts of
Eastern Turkey did not belong to a particular social group be-
cause it was a "private conflict," which suggests the absence of
a public face.22 3 These decisions indicate that France has not
applied the social perception test consistently over time.
220. See Lambert & Silga, supra note 215, at 45 (citing Commission des
Recours des R6fugies, Sections R6unies (CRR) (SR) decision No. 423904,
Oct. 17, 2003 (Fr.) (involving an applicant from the Dominican Republic
who claimed that she was forced into prostitution in Haiti)).
221. Id. at 45-46 (citing Commission des Recours des Rffugi6s, Sections
R6unies (CRR) (SR) decision No. 444000, Oct. 15, 2004 (Fr.) (involving a
woman from Pakistan who claimed that she had been forcibly married)) (cit-
ing also Commission des Recours des Rffugi6s, Sections R6unies (CRR)
(SR) decision No. 489014, Mar. 4, 2005 (Fr.) (involving a woman from Tur-
key who claimed that she was confined for refusing to marry)). In these
cases, the CCR noted that the women had transgressed social mores by refus-
ing to marry, which may imply some type of social recognition.
222. GENDER RELATED ASYLUM CLAIMS IN EUROPE, supra note 152, at 66 &
n.233 (citing Commission des Recours des Rffugids, Sections R6unies (CRR)
(SR) decision No. 361050, Dec. 7, 2001 (Fr.) (holding that parents who op-
pose having their daughters subjected to FGM can comprise a PSG)).
223. Id. at 67; cf cases cited supra note 221.
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3. Belgium
Belgium purports to require both a protected characteris-
tic and social perception, but has openly acknowledged that it
is flexible in practice about what approach is used. In 1992,
the Refugee Appeals Board explained that a "particular social
group" is
a group characterized either by innate and unalter-
able characteristics, or by anterior characteristics that
cannot be changed by the members (their history
and former experiences). [It may also be] a volunta-
rily composed group provided that the purpose of
the group is so fundamental to their human dignity
that one cannot demand that it be renounced. 224
Applying this definition, which closely tracks Acosta, the Board
recognized groups such as Romanian intellectuals, Iranians
with "progressive" or "western" attitudes, former civil servants
of President Doe in Liberia, and groups based on family ties,
all of which may lack social visibility. 225 In 1998, however, the
Refugee Appeals Board incorporated the social perception ap-
proach into its analysis, stating that a particular social group is
"a group of people sharing common characteristics that iden-
tify them as a distinctive unit amongst the entire society, and
that is seen as such, due to its characteristics, by the rest of the
population and the authorities." 2 2 6
Yet Belgian jurisprudence continued to allow a particular
social group to be based on either a protected characteristic or
social perception.227 Belgian decisions
often refer to the Canadian Supreme Court's opinion
in Ward v. Canada in order to stress the jurispruden-
tial evolution regarding the scope given to "social
group," quoting that "this evolution leads to [the
224. See Dirk Vanheule, Belgium, in WHO IS A REFUGEE? A COMPARATIVE
CASE LAw STUDY, supra note 187, at 57, 100-01 (quoting V.B.C (2 ch.), Apr.
8, 1992, E024).
225. Id. at 101.
226. Kosar, supra note 194, at 56 (quoting in translation Commision
Permanente de Recours des Rffugids [CPR] [Refugee Appeals Board] Oct.
21, 1998, F754).
227. See ECRE SUy, supra note 180, at 155 (noting that while Belgian law
ostensibly requires the satisfaction of both criteria, the test is applied flexibly
by courts).
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conclusion] that the social group can be defined
from the existence of inborn or immutable features,
such as gender."228
Some Belgian decisions refer to both English and French cases
in interpreting the meaning of a "particular social group," ex-
pressing "a concern to bring its interpretation of the notion of
the refugee definition in line with those of other EU Members
states."229
The Belgian legislation that implements the European
Qualification Directive provides that "a group must be consid-
ered to form a particular social group where in particular"
members of that group share a protected characteristic and
are perceived as distinct by society. 23 0 The words "must" and
"in particular" suggest that a PSG undoubtedly exists where
these two criteria are satisfied, but that a PSG may also be es-
tablished in other cases. Even if the legislation is interpreted as
imposing dual requirements, however, an analysis of cases de-
cided by the Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers (Belgian
Council for Aliens Law Litigation) since 2007 confirms that
the Council "exhibits quite a flexible approach, with no discus-
sion of the perception of a particular group in society," result-
ing in "an effective implementation of the protected character-
istics test with the social perception test merely assumed to
have been met rather than presenting an additional hurdle for
applicants to satisfy."231 A recent study of gender-related asy-
lum claims in Europe likewise found that in Belgium, "both
limbs can be considered cumulatively or independently."232
C. The Utility of a Comparative Approach
The interpretations of our sister signatories, discussed
above, do not provide an answer to the question of how to
define a "particular social group," but do provide useful infor-
mation that can help guide U.S. courts. One trend that
228. Jean-Yves Carlier and Dirk Vanheule, Where is the Reference? On the Lim-
ited Role of Transnational Dialogue in Belgian Refugee Law, in THE LIMITS OF
TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33, at 17, 26 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
229. Id. at 25-26.
230. FOSTER supra note 156, at 18 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
231. Id. at 36.
232. GENDER-RELATED ASYLUM CLAIMS IN EUROPE, supra note 152, at 60.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
445
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
emerges is that none of the other common law countries re-
quire social perception to establish a particular social group.
With the exception of Australia, they all follow the protected
characteristic approach. Yet even Australia does not apply so-
cial perception as a requirement. Another important point is
that countries that purport to require both a protected charac-
teristic and social perception often apply inconsistent or flexi-
ble approaches in practice (e.g., Germany, France, Belgium)
or simply have not had much-or any-practical experience
applying the PSG criterion.
The comparative analysis above also highlights how a so-
cial perception approach may lead to interpretations that are
inconsistent with well-established U.S. precedents. The cases
from Germany and France discussed above indicate three spe-
cific areas where this has occurred: cases where the PSG is
based on family, homosexuality, and female genital mutila-
tion. 23 3 Specifically, the social perception approach has led
Germany to conclude that a family is not a particular social
group unless its members bear visible markers of their family
identity, but the BIA and U.S. courts have long held that fam-
ily members can comprise a PSG, although opinions have
started to diverge based on the social visibility test as well.2 34
233. See Fatma Marouf, The Emerging Importance of "Social Visibility" in Defin-
ing a "Particular Social Group" and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related
to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 47, 79-102 (2008)
(discussing how a social perception approach has the power to undermine
claims based on sexual orientation, family membership, domestic violence,
and human trafficking).
234. See, e.g., In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (finding
that the shared characteristic that defines a PSG could be based on "kinship
ties"); In re H-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 337 342-43 (B.I.A. 1996) (indicating that
even distant relatives - members of a clan or subclan - can constitute a social
group); Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2004) ("We join
our sister circuits in holding that 'family' constitutes a 'particular social
group . . . ."'); Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Like
our sister circuits, we recognize that a family is a social group."); Iliev v. INS.,
127 F.3d 638, 642 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Our case law has suggested, with
some certainty, that a family constitutes a cognizable 'particular social
group. . . ."'); Fatin v. INS., 12 F.3d 1233, 1238-40 (3d Cir. 1993) (accepting
that "kinship ties" qualify as a particular social group); Gebremichael v. INS.,
10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) ("There can, in fact, be no plainer example of
a social group based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics
than that of the nuclear family."). Since the BIA introduced the social visibil-
ity requirement, opinions have diverged about whether a family satisfies that
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Moreover, France has found that homosexuals do not consti-
tute a particular social group unless there is some outward
manifestation of their sexual orientation, whereas the BIA and
U.S. courts have recognized that all homosexuals in certain
countries comprise a PSG.235 France has also recently found
that women who refuse FGM do not constitute a PSG unless
they transgress social norms by expressing their opposition to
the practice, which contradicts the opinions of several U.S. cir-
cuit courts explicitly rejecting the notion that opposition
should be part of the definition of the social group in cases
related to FGM. 2 3 6 The decisions of other circuit courts find-
requirement. Compare Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 126 (4th
Cir. 2011) ("[W]e can conceive of few groups more readily identifiable than
the family."), with Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2011)
("Constanza's family lacks the visibility and particularity required to consti-
tute a social group.").
235. See, e.g., In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990)
(recognizing "homosexuals" as a PSG in a case involving a gay man from
Cuba); Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding
that "all alien homosexuals are members of a 'particular social group"');
Kadri v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Sexual orientation ... is
the basis for inclusion in a particular social group"); Nabulwala v. Gonzales,
481 F.3d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 2007) ("The IJ [Immigration Judge] explicitly
(and the BIA implicitly) recognized that homosexuals may be a member of a
'particular social group . . . .'); Eke v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 372, 382 (7th Cir.
2008) (clarifying that the IJ had recognized homosexuals in Nigeria as a PSG
but concluded that Eke had failed to establish his membership in that group
because of problems with his credibility); Neri-Garcia v. Holder, 696 F.3d
1003, 1007 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that "the IJ found Neri-Garcia to be a
member of the particular social group of homosexual males from Mexico");
Ayala v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 947 (11th Cir. 2010) ("The [BIA]
agreed with the immigration judge that 'homosexuals make up a particular
social group . . . .'),
236. In its initial published decision addressing FGM, the BIA defined the
PSG as "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had
FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice." In re Kasinga,
21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996). Since then, several appellate courts
have criticized the BIA's inclusion of opposition to FGM in its definition of
the social group. See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1200 (10th Cir.
2005) ("[O]pposition is not a necessary component of a social group other-
wise defined by gender and tribal membership."); Mohammed v. Gonzales,
400 F.3d 785, 796-97 & n.16 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating "[w]e believe that op-
position is not required in order to meet the 'on account of' prong in fe-
male genital mutilation cases" and broadly defining the social group as
"young girls in the Benadiri clan" or alternatively "Somali[ ] females"); Bah
v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 113 n.20 (2d Cir. 2008) (" [U] nless the BIA reasona-
bly explains why opposition to the practice is a necessary prerequisite, we
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ing a PSG where there was no evidence of overt opposition to
FGM also contradict France's interpretation.2 3 7
By showing how the social perception approach has influ-
enced the jurisprudence in other countries, a comparative
analysis serves as a harbinger of how that interpretation may
shape the development of case law in the United States. Appel-
late courts that question whether the BIA's social visibility re-
quirement will really lead to outcomes that contradict hold-
ings in prior cases should be especially wary of the inconsisten-
cies noted above regarding PSGs based on family,
homosexuality, and FGM. Indeed, since introducing the social
visibility requirement, the BIA has already begun to disavow
family membership as the basis for a PSG in numerous unpub-
lished decisions, although "kinship ties" was given as a proto-
typical example of a PSG in Acosta.238
tend to agree with the Ninth Circuit's observation that 'the shared character-
istic that motivates the persecution is not opposition, but the fact that the
victims are female in a culture that mutilates the genitalia of its females.'")
(quoting Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 797 n.16); Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d
513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that "all Somali females have a well-
founded fear of persecution based solely on gender given the prevalence of
FGM").
237. See, e.g., Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding
that a minor girl who feared being subjected to FGM in Ethiopia qualified as
a refugee, without any mention of whether or not the child or her mother
had voiced public opposition to the practice); Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d
492, 499 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the agency did not dispute that the
petitioner belonged to a PSG in a case involving a Nigerian woman whose
family kept pressuring her to undergo FGM and who responded to the stress
by locking herself in her house before coming to the United States, where
the record did not suggest she publicly opposed the practice); Abankwah v.
INS, 185 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that "the BIA did not dispute
that Abankwah's fear of genital mutilation was on account of her member-
ship in a cognizable social group" in a case involving a Ghanaian woman
from the Nkhumssa tribe, where the facts did not indicate that she had ever
publicly opposed FGM); Kourouma v. Holder, 588 F.3d 234, 244 (4th Cir.
2009) (vacating an adverse credibility determination and finding prima facie
eligibility for asylum in a case involving a partially circumcised woman who
fled Guinea after her husband demanded that she be recircumcised, where
there was no mention of whether or not she publicly opposed the practice).
238. See, e.g., In re F-N-, at *2 (B.I.A. Apr. 16, 2010) (holding that the two
"purported social groups [young Salvadoran boys resisting gang recruitment
and their families] lack the necessary particularity and social visibility"); In re
G-M-, No. A88-558-110, at *2 (B.I.A. Mar. 24, 2010) (stating that while the
BIA agrees "that family may constitute a particular social group ... respon-
dents have failed to demonstrate that their family has any recognized level of
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A third lesson that emerges from the above analysis is that
"social perception" is not a clear concept and has been inter-
preted differently by various countries and various courts
within a given country. Disagreement and confusion persists
about whether social perception should be defined subjec-
tively (France and possibly Germany) or objectively (Austra-
lia); the scope of the relevant community that must perceive
the group; whether social perception requires literal visibility,
as indicated by some German and French decisions, or
whether more abstract recognition of the group is permissible;
whether social perception differs from distinction in the sense
of being "set apart" from the rest of society; whether specific
evidence must be submitted to demonstrate social perception
or if such perception can be presumed, as in Belgium; and
what types of evidence would satisfy this test.23 9
Some U.S. courts have already noted these areas of confu-
sion in discussing the BIA's social visibility requirement.24 0
The comparative analysis not only magnifies these contested
and confusing aspects of the analysis, but also suggests that the
confusion may be inherent to the social perception approach
itself, rather than due simply to shortcomings in the BIA's ex-
social visibility"); In re R-N-, at *2 (B.I.A. Jan. 28, 2008) (holding "respondent
has not shown that Mexican society, or any substantial segment of it, per-
ceives his immediate family to constitute a discrete 'social group' in any
sense, so as to satisfy the 'social visibility' criteria elucidated in this Board's
precedents"); see also In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 (B.I.A. 2008)
(holding, where the applicant was the sister of a boy recruited for a gang,
that alleged group of family members of those who have been recruited and
resist gangs is too amorphous because it could include uncles, cousins, etc.).
239. See FoSTER, supra note 156, at 10, 12, 33, 37-38 (discussing the differ-
ent evidentiary requirements that Australia, France, and the United States
impose to prove social perception); see also In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 587
(finding "little in the background evidence of record to indicate that" the
proposed social group was "'perceived as a group' by society"); Mendez-Bar-
rera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2010) (dismissing the appeal in part
because the applicant had "failed to provide even a scintilla of evidence" to
show social visibility).
240. See, e.g., Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009)
("Often it is unclear whether the Board is using the term 'social visibility' in
the literal sense or in the 'external criterion' sense, or even whether it un-
derstands the difference."); See Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081,
1089 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (remanding for the BIA to clarify whose
perspectives are most relevant: "the Petitioner herself? Her social circle? Her
native country as a whole? The United States? The global community?").
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planations and reasoning. This observation is consistent with
the conclusions reached by various scholars. For example,
Michelle Foster has concluded that the social perception ap-
proach is inherently more subjective and less precise than the
protected characteristic approach, as exemplified by the in-
consistent decisions that have resulted from applications of so-
cial perception in Australia. 2 4 1 I have also argued elsewhere
that social perception is a subjective process that is inherently
difficult to assess because it depends on complex emotional
and cognitive interactions and changes with context.242 As dis-
cussed further in Part V below, whether or not a given inter-
pretation of a treaty term can be consistently applied should
be a factor that courts consider in deciding whether or not to
adopt that interpretation.
Finally, engaging in comparative analysis is instructive be-
cause it illustrates the degree to which the processes of "norm
export" and "norm convergence" have occurred. 2 4 3 Examin-
ing the interpretations of our sister signatories shows how
Acosta's protected characteristic approach was formulated by
the BIA and endorsed by U.S. courts, then picked up by nu-
merous foreign courts and embedded in their own jurispru-
dence. 2 4 4 This process of norm export reflects Acosta's persua-
sive power. The foreign courts that adopted Acosta (modifying,
interpreting, and internalizing it) promoted "norm conver-
gence," which is "the tendency of domestic and international
law to converge on a single, worldwide normative standard."245
Such norm convergence responded to the need for an interna-
tional consensus on the meaning of a "particular social
group," while also reflecting an increased consciousness
241. See FOSTER, supra note 156, at 34, 37 n.216 (finding that the social
perception test is "inherently less precise and more open to subjectivity than
the more objective protected characteristics approach"; and describing in-
consistent Australian decisions on whether "failed asylum seekers" constitute
a particular social group).
242. See Marouf, supra note 233, at 72-75.
243. See Melissa Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transna-
tional judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEo. L.J.
487, 502-03 (2005) (discussing "the twin concepts of norm export and norm
convergence" as "the heart of [a] co-constitutive process").
244. See id. at 503 ("If the norm becomes sufficiently embedded in a large
number of other domestic or international legal regimes, it becomes the
dominant normative standard on a given issue.").
245. Id.
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among courts of their role as participants in a transnational
dialogue about the definition of a "refugee."2 4 6 The above
analysis shows that all contracting parties to the Protocol have
not yet converged on a single definition of "particular social
group," but a significant amount of norm convergence around
Acosta has already occurred. In deciding whether or not to ac-
cept social visibility as a requirement, U.S. courts should con-
sider the degree of norm convergence and the impact that de-
parting from Acosta would have on the ultimate goal of uni-
form treaty interpretation.
V. How To GIVE WEIGHT TO THE INTERPRETATIONS OF
OUR SISTER SIGNATORIES
Agreeing on the principle that courts should consider the
interpretations of other parties to an international treaty does
little to alleviate the challenging questions that arise from that
principle. The Supreme Court has never offered any concrete
guidance on how, practically, to apply this principle.2 4 7 Nor
has this issue received serious attention from scholars.248 As
Guy Goodwin-Gill notes, the thesis that courts "ought to have
some regard to relevant case law from the jurisdictions of
other states party to the [Refugee] Convention . .. leaves many
questions hanging, among them, what is 'relevant' case law,
and to what purpose and how exactly is it to be put to use."2 49
Part A of this section proposes a framework with specific con-
ditions and factors for selecting and weighing foreign authori-
ties. Part B and C address two additional issues that are unique
to the interpretation of the Refugee Convention and Protocol,
which involve what, if anything, U.S. courts should do with the
interpretations the European Union, as it takes steps towards
the creation of a Common European Asylum System, and how
to treat the interpretations of UNHCR, which exercises state-
246. "The [International Association of Refugee LawJudges] was set up in
1995 to facilitate communication and dialogue between refugee law judges
around the world in an attempt to develop consistent and coherent refugee
jurisprudence." H6lne Lambert, Transnational Law, Judges and Refugees in the
European Union, in THE LIMITs OF TRANSNATIONAL LAw, supra note 33, at 1, 7.
247. Van Alstine, supra note 86, at 1936-37.
248. Id. at 1937 ("Other than passing references there is no scholarly anal-
ysis at all of the Supreme Court's barren statement on the relevance of prior
foreign court precedents.").
249. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 36, at 204.
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like functions but obviously is not a state party. Part D then
considers and addresses concerns regarding the potential neg-
ative impact that a comparative analysis may have on U.S. juris-
prudence.
A. A Framework for Selecting and Weighing Foreign Authority
Of the 146 States Parties to the Protocol, how many must
express a point of view on the meaning of a "particular social
group" in order to influence the United States' interpretation?
Are the interpretations of the countries discussed above suffi-
cient? How much weight should they receive? What about
States Parties that have not yet had an opportunity to address
the issue of social visibility? Should their silence be taken as
agreement with the countries discussed above? Both the Su-
preme Court's principle of giving "weight" and the holistic ap-
plication of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention sug-
gest that the impact of foreign authority on treaty interpreta-
tion falls somewhere along a sliding scale, rather than
providing either a binding interpretation or being totally neg-
ligible.250 Since the influence of foreign authority is not an all-
250. Cf Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or Misusing Foreign Law to Decide
Domestic Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 29 (2005). (advocat-
ing "a sliding scale for using foreign law as primary and persuasive authority
to decide a domestic statutory claim"); Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism:
The judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 652-91 (2007) (examining the role of international
human rights treaties, specifically the ICCPR, in constitutional interpreta-
tion in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States and finding
that the interpretive techniques fall along a spectrum, from the modest use
of human rights treaties as "gilding the lily" to a more dramatic harmoniza-
tion of domestic constitutional law with human rights norms); Waters, Get-
ting Beyond the Crossfire Phenomenon, supra note 104, at 643-46 (arguing that
"|ludicial participation in transnational judicial dialogue on constitutional
interpretation is not a straightforward always/never, for/against proposi-
tion" and urging courts to adopt "a more nuanced analysis of 'when' and
'where' - that is, in which specific contexts, and using which specific inter-
pretive techniques - citation to foreign authority may be appropriate"). Wa-
ters' discussion of a "spectrum" or "range" in the use of human rights trea-
ties in constitutional interpretation mirrors the "sliding scale" discussed here
about the weight given to foreign authority in treaty interpretation. See id.;
see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. J., U.S. Supreme Court, Address before
South African Constitutional Court (Feb. 7, 2006) (quoting Judge Patricia
Wald), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/view
speeches.aspx?Filename=sp_02-07b-06.html ("It's hard for me to see that the
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or-nothing phenomenon, this Article proposes a combination
of conditions and factors to help guide courts in selecting and
weighing these foreign decisions.
1. Conditions for Selecting Foreign Authorities
Scholars writing about the selection of foreign authority
have focused largely on the context of constitutional interpre-
tation, proposing criteria that often do not apply to treaty in-
terpretation. For example, the circumstances surrounding the
drafting of the foreign state's constitution, the economic and
social characteristics of the foreign state, and a shared history
with the foreign state, may be relevant factors in selecting for-
eign authorities to aid in constitutional interpretation, but do
not make much sense in the context of interpreting an inter-
national treaty. 25 1 A model proposed by Eric Posner and Cass
Sunstein, however, does provide a useful starting point. Posner
and Sunstein argue that consulting the law of foreign states
makes sense under the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which pro-
vides that, under certain conditions, a widespread belief, ac-
cepted by a number of independent actors, is highly likely to
be correct.252 Three specific conditions discussed by Posner
and Sunstein are adapted and applied here to the context of
refugee law.
The first condition in Posner and Sunstein's model re-
quires that "a foreign state's law must reflect ajudgment based
on that state's private information about how some question is
best answered."253 In other words, the foreign law must be
based on information acquired through research or local
knowledge, rather than a political dynamic that has nothing to
do with the issue at hand.25 4 Posner and Sunstein alternatively
describe this condition as requiring the state to be "sincere,"
use of foreign decisional law is an up-or-down proposition. I see it rather as a
pool of potential and useful information and thought that must be mined
with caution and restraint.").
251. See, e.g., Andrew Friedman, Beyond Cheny-Picking: Selection Criteria for
the Use ofForeign Law in Domestic Constitutional Juisprudence, 44 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 873 (2011); Jacob Foster, The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpre-
tation: Lessons from South Africa, 45 U.S.F. L. REv. 79 (2010).
252. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L.
REv. 131, 136 (2006).
253. Id. at 144.
254. Id. at 148.
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rather than "strategic," not in the psychological sense, but in
the sense of basing its judgment on real knowledge rather
than unrelated factors, such as the influence of an interest
group that does not care about the facts. 255 For the foreign
authority to be useful, it should also be based on information
that is not directly observable by U.S. decision-makers.
In the asylum context, this would mean that the foreign
state's interpretation of the Protocol should stem from the lo-
cal knowledge provided by actual asylum cases that have been
decided by that state's government, or legislation based on ex-
perience with those cases. Since U.S. courts do not observe
those cases directly, the foreign state's interpretation provides
meaningful information. In order for this criterion to be met,
then, the country should engage in sincere asylum adjudica-
tion, not just be a passive member of the Protocol. Countries
that are parties to the Protocol but where UNHCR performs
the role of refugee status determination would be excluded
under this condition. UNHCR has taken over responsibility in
states where asylum determination procedures have not yet
been established, the national determination process is "mani-
festly inadequate," or the national determinations are based
on an "erroneous interpretation" of the Convention. 256 These
states would lack the private information necessary for their
interpretations, if any exist, to be useful to U.S. courts.
The second condition requires that for a foreign state's
interpretation to be relevant, it "must address a problem that
is similar to the problem before the domestic court."25 7 Posner
and Sunstein explain that "[t]his similarity condition refers
not only to the facts ... but also to the legal principles, institu-
tions and values of the foreign state."258 In the context of in-
terpreting the Refugee Convention and Protocol, different le-
gal principles in a foreign state may indeed render the inter-
255. Id. at 147-48.
256. UNHCR, REFUGEE STATUs DETERMINATION: IDENTIFYING WHO IS A REF-
UGEE 11 (2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/43141f5
d4.pdf. In 2010, UNHCR bore sole responsibility for RSD in 46 countries,
receiving a total of 96,800 applications, and shared responsibility with states
in 21 countries, jointly accepting 6,200 applications. Thus, UNHCR
processes about twice as many applications annually as the United States.
UNHCR STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2010, supra note 129, at 41-42.
257. Posner & Sunstein, The Law of Other States, supra note 252, at 144.
258. Id.
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pretive "vote" of a particular state less helpful or even
irrelevant. How states interpret a "particular social group"
once again provides some good examples. In a study of Dutch
refugee law, for instance, Thomas Spijkerboer observes that
'just which of the five persecution grounds is related to the
(feared) persecution is virtually considered immaterial"259 He
explains that "[o] nce the discriminatory nature of the persecu-
tion has been established, the particular rubric under which it
falls is 'of less importance.' "2 6 0 Thus, while the Netherlands
may end up granting asylum in many of the same types of cases
that would be decided in the United States on the social group
ground, it is not applying the same legal principles. The
Netherlands' decision to define a "particular social group"
based on either a protected characteristic or social perception
means little if it does not even consider the protected ground
relevant to its analysis.
Another example is France, which requires the persecu-
tion to be part of the social group definition. In this respect,
France's interpretation flatly contradicts that of the United
States and many other countries, which have explicitly rejected
defining the social groups in terms of the persecution, deem-
ing such definitions circular. Since France's interpretation sug-
gests the operation of a different legal principle (one that con-
flates the elements of the refugee definition), courts should
exercise caution in considering its interpretation. Germany
also applies different legal principles because it usually ad-
dresses the types of asylum cases that would be decided under
the "particular social group" ground under its own political
asylum law, which is worded differently and does not incorpo-
rate the Convention's definition of a "refugee." In those cases,
Germany is not analyzing a Convention term, so it is not really
addressing the same legal issue. If there is a material differ-
ence between the foreign state's statute and the refugee defini-
tion set forth in the Protocol, then it would be improper for
domestic courts to compare the results. 261
259. THOMAS SPIJKERBOER, GENDER AND REFUGEE STATUS 115 (2000) (em-
phasis added).
260. Id. (citation omitted).
261. See Rebecca R. Zubaty, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution: Delimiting
the Range of Persuasive Authority, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1413, 1452 (2007) ("Where
the text of the constitution or statute examined by the foreign court materi-
ally differs from the U.S. provision at issue, it is disingenuous to compare the
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The third condition regarding independent judgment is a
critical part of Posner and Sunstein's model. They demon-
strate that if a foreign law exists "because the foreign state
mimicked some other state, then the law would not count as
an independent vote." 2 6 2 If a foreign state is just going with
the flow in adopting a particular rule, then it is not adding any
new information about the value of the rule. The lack of inde-
pendent judgment can result in a "cascade," where "there is
far less reason to trust the judgments of many voters, or states,
because the particular judgments of many or most do not add
information." 26 3 As an example, Posner and Sunstein note that
if former British colonies adopt British laws just because they
do not have the time or resources to come up with new laws,
then "the existence of identical British-derived legal rules in
dozens of states provides no more information about the value
of the rules than it would if they existed in only one state-
Britain itself."2 64
Applying this reasoning to the asylum context, courts
should be cautious about the interpretations of EU Member
States that may have simply copied the minimum standard set
forth in the EU's Qualification Directive without exercising
any independent judgment. While some states may have delib-
erated over the interpretations in the Directive, others may
have assumed a passive role and just accepted the outcome of
deliberations by others. Moreover, states may have adopted
the Directive as a whole in the spirit of cooperation and har-
monization, even though they disagreed with specific parts of
it. In this respect, the interpretations of the EU and its Mem-
ber States raise issues that parallel the ones Posner and Sun-
stein discuss regarding the interpretation of the European
Court of Human Rights and parties to the European Conven-
tion. They note that "[m] any parties to the convention became
parties in order to obtain the benefits of cooperation with
other European countries ... despite their doubts about particular
results reached by the courts and the reasoning used to reach those results
without acknowledging and addressing such differences.").
262. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 252, at 144-45.
263. Id. at 160; see also Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law
in Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 653, 684-85 (2009)
(discussing the problems posed by cascades).
264. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 252, at 160.
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rules or norms rather than because of them."265 Domestic courts
should therefore be especially cautious of the "cascade effect"
when mere membership in a regional or international body
compels a particular interpretation, rather than reflecting an
independent judgment by the foreign state.
Likewise, courts should be cautious about states that go
along with UNHCR's interpretations without evaluating them
on their own. While many states might adopt UNHCR's inter-
pretations only after going through a deliberate process, ren-
dering their interpretations at least partially independent,
other states may blindly endorse UNHCR's interpretations, ei-
ther because they are enormously deferential to UNHCR or
because they have largely abdicated refugee status determina-
tion to UNHCR and have no interest in analyzing the issues on
their own.
In sum, the proposed "ground rules" for considering a
foreign state's interpretation of the Refugee Protocol are as
follows: (1) the foreign state must sincerely engage in asylum
adjudication, so that its interpretation is based on local knowl-
edge and actual information; (2) the foreign state must ad-
dress a question similar to the one before the domestic court
and share a common general understanding of the concept
involved; and (3) the foreign state must exercise independent
judgment in its interpretation, rather than blindly copying an-
other state or a regional or international authority.
2. Factors to Consider in Giving Weight to Foreign Authorities
While these ground rules provide initial steps in deter-
mining whether to consider a certain foreign authority, they
do not assist domestic courts in deciding how much weight to
give that authority. Building on the work of other scholars who
have considered the role of foreign authorities in different
contexts, this section proposes six factors for courts to con-
sider when giving weight: (1) whether the foreign state is "spe-
cially affected" by asylum applications; (2) whether the foreign
state has a well-developed body of asylum law, through juris-
prudence or legislation; (3) the persuasiveness of the foreign
state's interpretation; (4) the precedential value of the foreign
authority; (5) whether a given interpretation can be consist-
265. Id. at 165-66 (emphasis added).
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ently applied; and (6) whether the interpretation reflects the
human rights principles underlying the treaty. These factors
should be examined as a whole in determining how much
weight to give a foreign authority.
a. Specially Affected States
While the law of treaties is premised on a legal equality of
states that renders vast differences among them invisible, cer-
tain treaties affect some states far more than others. 266 The
Refugee Convention and Protocol fall into this category. While
these treaties have 145 and 146 States Parties respectively, not
every state is equally affected by asylum-seekers. As noted in
Part IV above, one-third of all asylum applications are concen-
trated in just ten countries: South Africa, the United States,
France, Germany, Sweden, Ecuador, Malaysia, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Belgium.267 These specially affected
states have the greatest amount of aggregate information, in
the sense that they see the greatest number and variety of cases
and are consequently exposed to the most fact patterns. Expo-
sure to these concrete cases provides important context for in-
terpreting challenging terms such as "membership in a partic-
ular social group." Looking at specially affected states there-
fore helps give effect to the first condition that Posner and
Sunstein describe, which emphasizes the conditions of the for-
eign state's judgment, including the information that provides
the basis for the foreign state decision.
While it may seem odd to pay particular attention to the
interpretations of specially affected countries given the sover-
eign equality of states in international law, there is legal sup-
port for this position. The International Court of Justice, for
instance, has recognized the importance of "specially affected
States" in determining when a practice may become a rule of
customary international law.268 Daniel H. Joyner specifically
266. CATHERINE BR6LMANN, THE INSTITUTIONAL VEIL IN PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 3 (2007) ("The law of treaties ... proceeds from the legal equal-
ity of actors .... This allows for the application of objective, 'external' crite-
ria, while divergent institutional characteristics and factual circumstances
are rendered invisible to the general legal order. This is how in international
law Lichtenstein and the United States are construed as being equal . . .
267. See statistics cited supra note 129.
268. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R. Ger. v. Den.; F.R. Ger. v.
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 73-74 (Feb. 20) (finding that a treaty provision did
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argues that the "specially affected States" rule derived from the
ICJ's decisions also applies to Article 31 of the Vienna Conven-
tion, permitting the agreements and practice of only some
states to influence the interpretation of a treaty.269 Other
scholars similarly contend that "it is not simply a question of
how many States participate in the practice, but also which
States." 2 7 0 The notion that not all States have equal weight also
finds support in the Restatement on Foreign Relations, which
notes, "there is no precise formula to indicate how widespread
a practice must be, but it should reflect wide acceptance among
the states particularly involved in the relevant activity."271
Giving more weight to the interpretations of "specially af-
fected" states may be criticized as a thinly veiled attempt to
favor the interpretations of powerful Western nations. Many
scholars have noted how powerful, Western countries have
much greater influence than developing countries on the cre-
not have to exist for a long time in order to become a customary rule if
endorsed by States whose interests are "specially affected," which, in this
case, included States with access or claims to the Continental Shelf, as long
as the treaty reflected widespread and representative State practice); Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
535-36 (July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry) (recognizing
that "[i]f the nuclear States are the States most affected, their contrary view
is an important factor to be taken into account, even though numerically
they constitute a small proportion (around 2.7 percent) of the United Na-
tions membership of 185 States," but finding that States against which nu-
clear weapons may be used are also among the States most concerned).
269. DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROLIFERATION OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 35 (2009); see also H. Meijers, How Is Interna-
tional Law Made?: The Stages of Growth of International Law and the Use of Its
Customary Rules, 9 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 5-7 (1978) (arguing that only the
practice of "relevant" States is necessary to develop a customary rule); MARK
E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON
THE THEORY AND PRAC:TICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 32-33 (2d ed.
1997) (quoting R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Customs, 129 RECUEIL DES CouRS 27,
66 (1970)) (arguing that weight should be given based on "the size of the
State, the volume of its international relations, and, in general, the contribu-
tion that it makes to the development of international law").
270. Introduction, in CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw xxv,
xxxvii (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
271. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 cmt. b (1987) (emphasis added). The Restatement further pro-
vides that "[flailure of a significant number of important states to adopt a
practice can prevent a principle from becoming general customary law. . .
Id. (emphasis added).
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ation of customary international law through "state prac-
tice."27 2 Some even criticize the role of powerful nations in
creating international law as an imperialistic threat to the
rights of developing countries.273 Since richer countries have
more developed courts, published opinions that are written or
translated into English, and the resources to make these opin-
ions available online, they generally play a more influential
role in shaping rules based on state practice.274 While these
concerns are valid, the overlap between "specially affected
states" and powerful states is not complete in the asylum con-
text. As noted above, South Africa, which is neither a Western
nation nor industrialized, receives the greatest number of asy-
lum applications. Examining specially affected parties in the
asylum context therefore opens the door to engage more
272. See, e.g., George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary Interna-
tional Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 555 (2005) (quoting Oscar
Schachter, New Custom: Power, Opinio juris, and Contrary Practice, in THEORY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21sT CENTURY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSK 531, 536-37 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed.,
1996) ("[Tlhe great body of customary international law was made by re-
markably few States."); Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International
Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115; 150-51 (2005) (" [P]owerful states dominate
the question of state practice"); Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International
Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 537 (1993) ("[W]hen authorities examine the
evidence necessary to establish customary law, they consider actions of a lim-
ited number of states, often only the largest, most prominent, or most inter-
ested among them."); Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: Inter-
national Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARv. L. REv. 1791, 1848
(2009) ("[Courts] rely on salient instances of state practice (usually the prac-
tices of powerful Western nations) . . . because there are too many states and
too many potential instances of state consent (or nonconsent) to examine
individually.").
273. See, e.g., Ernesto Hernindez-L6pez, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantd-
namo, Cuba: Does the "Empire Strike Back"?, 62 SMU L. REv. 117, 139 (2009)
(arguing that international law developed from "contexts of empire, coloni-
zation, and protectorates," and that the norms of international law devel-
oped from state practices that "are often an outgrowth of European states, or
more powerful states, expanding their influence worldwide"); Melissa Rob-
bins, Comment, Powerful States, Customary Law and the Erosion offHuman Rights
Through Regional Enforcement, 35 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 274, 297-301 (2005) (ar-
guing that giving more weight to the practice of powerful States will lead to
the disappearance of developing countries' rights).
274. See Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power ofRules: Customary Inter-
national Law from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109,
143-44 (1995) (discussing the impact of state resources and wealth on a
state's ability to shape the formation of customary international law).
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deeply with the laws and interpretations of less powerful coun-
tries, rather than simply reinforcing the views of those that al-
ready dominate the international stage. Ecuador, with the
sixth highest number of asylum applications, is also a develop-
ing nation-one of the poorest in South America-but wide-
spread discrimination and procedural shortcomings in its asy-
lum and refugee determination process caution against giving
weight to its interpretations, at least at the present time, under
the first condition discussed above. 275
b. A Well-Developed Body of Asylum Law, Through jurisprudence
or Detailed Legislation
The second factor relevant to deciding how much weight
to give a foreign authority is whether the foreign state has a
well-developed body of asylum law, which can be shaped either
by jurisprudence or detailed legislation. This factor builds on
the second and third conditions articulated by Posner and
Sunstein. A country with a well-developed body of asylum law
is more likely to apply the same legal principles as the United
States and avoid odd interpretations like France's conflation of
persecution with the protected ground. Moreover, the inter-
pretations of foreign states with well-developed asylum laws are
275. See Adina Appelbaum, Challenges to Refugee Protection in Ecuador: Reflec-
tions from World Refugee Day, GEORGETOWN PUBLIC POLICY REVIEw (June 26,
2012, 1:31 PM), http://gppreview.com/2012/06/26/challenges-to-refugee-
protection-in-ecuador-reflections-from-world-refugee-day/ ("Widespread dis-
crimination and xenophobia against refugees shape decision makers' per-
spectives and frequently influence them to seek loopholes to legal protective
mechanisms."). Nearly 99% of the refugees and asylum-seekers in Ecuador
are of Columbian origin and they frequently face discrimination. Id. During
the Universal Periodic Review process in May 2012, U.N. members praised
Ecuador for its implementation of an Enhanced Registration Process (ERP)
for refugees, but that process has since been suspended, and the status of
tens of thousands of refugees may be revoked. Id. Changes in the application
process, including "accelerated procedures" that compromise due process,
have also resulted in nearly 30% of applicants being declared inadmissible,
resulting in a drop in the refugee recognition rates from 74% in 2009 to
24% in 2011. Id. In addition, although Ecuador used to provide a more ex-
pansive definition of a "refugee" than did the Convention pursuant to the
1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, that definition was restricted
under a new decree called Decreto 1182, making it harder for those fleeing
mass violence to qualify. Id. Moreover, "[t]he Ecuadorian government has
recently drastically reduced the recognition of gender-based violence as
grounds for seeking refugee status . . . ." Id.
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more likely to reflect independent judgments. Taking into
consideration the state's body of asylum law would also limit
the influence of countries that have no functional refugee de-
termination system, which is appropriate since an informed,
independent judgment represents one of the conditions for
using foreign authority.276 For common law countries, the asy-
lum jurisprudence should show sound legal analysis with de-
tailed explanations of how the courts arrived at their out-
comes. Civil law countries would not be excluded under this
factor if the judicial decisions explain the courts' reasoning or
if the countries have detailed legislation that specifically ad-
dresses the issue facing the U.S. court.
While one might imagine that the category of "specially
affected states" captures those that have the most well devel-
oped case law on asylum issues, this is not the case. For exam-
ple, Australia and New Zealand have a highly sophisticated
body of jurisprudence but receive a relatively small volume of
asylum applications. 2 7 7 France and Germany have a high vol-
ume of applications but the jurisprudence is relatively much
276. In this respect, the decision about where to look for foreign authority
somewhat mirrors the analysis in forum selection, where courts review the
"adequacy" of a foreign forum in determining whether or not to transfer a
case abroad. Just as "the recognition of a minimum standard of international
justice" governs issues of forum selection, U.S. courts could choose to give
weight to countries that have a minimum level of procedure and substantive
law on asylum issues. SeeAnnie-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts,
44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 211 (2003) (stating that decisions of the adequacy of
foreign forums in U.S. courts involve determinations of "a minimum stan-
dard of international justice"). While this consideration, too, could trigger
accusations of political favoritism, Slaughter points out that "[c]ontrary to
appearances . . . adequate forum determinations do not depend on first
world versus third world status." Id. at 212. She finds that decisions in that
context actually turn on whether "a foreign legal system violates a minimum
standard of transnational justice, such as through overt bias, systemic corrup-
tion, or denial of basic due process . . . ." Id. at 213.
277. Australia and New Zealand had only 3,760 and 216 asylum cases
pending respectively at the end of 2010. See UNHCR STATIsTIcAL YEARBOOK
2010, supra note 129, at 86 tbl.9. One of the ways that Australia has reduced
the number of individuals seeking asylum under its laws is by "excising"
4,891 places from its territory for the purpose of refugee status determina-
tion. In those places, the ordinary safeguards associated with the "onshore"
domestic asylum system did not apply. See Michelle Foster & Jason Pobjoy, A
Failed Case of Legal Exceptionalism? Refugee Status Determination in Australia's
'Excised' Territory, 23 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 583 (2011) (discussing Australia's
attempt to create "zones of exception" within Australian territory wherein
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less developed. The United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom would fall into both categories, receiving a high
number of applications and having a rich body of jurispru-
dence.
c. Persuasiveness of the Foreign State's Interpretation
The third factor involves the persuasiveness of the foreign
state's interpretation. This factor focuses on the substantive
content of a specific interpretation, rather than general char-
acteristics of the foreign state. Although the language of Arti-
cle 31(b) (2) of the Vienna Convention underscores the im-
portance of widespread agreement, just counting the number
of states that endorse a given interpretation does not provide a
satisfying method of analysis. The depth of the reasoning is
obviously important.278 Assessing the reasons behind an inter-
pretive trend or consensus is necessary to understand whether
the interpretation is consistent with the text, object, and pur-
pose of the treaty, which are other critical aspects of interpre-
tation. These reasons may be found in a judicial decision or in
the legislative history of a foreign statute.
Where two different interpretations exist, one backed by
strong, persuasive legal reasoning and the other not, courts
should give more weight to the interpretation supported by
sound legal analysis. The two different tests for establishing a
particular social group represent outcomes, but domestic
courts should not blindly follow one outcome or another with-
out understanding the process that led to that outcome. Giv-
ing weight to persuasive foreign authorities also reinforces the
condition requiring independent judgment, since the mere
fact of consensus "could be the result of international arm-
twisting, legitimacy-seeking or simply a tendency to fall into
patterns by imitating the behavior of other states ('accultura-
tion')."279
the protections of the onshore domestic refugee system were limited or inap-
plicable).
278. Cf Zubaty, supra note 261, at 1441-47 (discussing the depth of rea-
soning as a relevant factor in using foreign law for purposes of constitutional
interpretation).
279. Vlad F. Perju, The Puzzling Parameters of the Foreign Law Debate, 2007
UTAH L. REv. 167, 180; see also Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law of
Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law: The Lessons of History, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
1335, 1362 (2007) ("Foreign law is also entitled to more weight when it is
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d. Precedential Value of the Foreign Authority
The precedential value of a foreign authority is also im-
portant. In discussing the use of foreign law in constitutional
interpretation, Rebecca Zubaty argues that "[w]here the rea-
soning of a judicial opinion is not a source of law in its own
country, its reliability for the purposes of the reason-borrowing
approach is thus called into question."280 In the context of
treaty interpretation, the issue is not just about reason borrow-
ing but about whether a decision really reflects the interpreta-
tion of that state party. If a decision has no precedential value,
then it may reflect the interpretation of a certain judge in a
given case, but there is nothing to say that another judge ad-
dressing a similar case the next day would not decide differ-
ently, which says nothing about how the state party interprets
the issue. Thus, either the judicial decision must be binding or
there must be a sufficient number of decisions to show that
the state party endorses that interpretation.281
The majority in Olympic Airways implicitly recognized this
principle in noting that the foreign authorities on which Jus-
tice Scalia relied were immediate appellate courts, rather than
the highest courts in those countries. This Article does not ar-
gue that courts should only consider the interpretations of the
highest courts, but that the higher the court and the greater
the precedential value, the more weight the decision should
carry. Returning to the example of how to interpret the defini-
tion of a "particular social group," decisions from the highest
courts in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia should
carry more weight than decisions by refugee boards in some
other countries.
If the foreign authority is a civil law country where the
doctrine of "stare decisis" does not apply, U.S. courts should
pay attention to trends in judicial interpretations, as the doc-
trine of jurisprudence constante provides that the persuasive
force of an interpretation increases as that interpretation be-
persuasively justified; and to less weight when it seems to reflect another
country's peculiarities.").
280. Zubaty, supra note 261, at 1447.
281. See id. at 1447-48 ("Rulings acquire de facto precedential weight
where subsequent judges adhere to a particular judicial interpretation of a
statue or a code over a period of many years.").
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comes more consistent.282 Moreover, if a relevant interpreta-
tion is set forth in legislation, that legislation would normally
carry the same weight as a precedent by the highest court of a
common law country, assuming that it is implemented as writ-
ten. If however, there is evidence that the actual practice dif-
fers from the law on the books, as in the case of Belgium's
interpretation of a "particular social group" (depending on
how one interprets Belgium's legislation), then U.S. courts
should focus on the country's actual practice. Similarly, if a
relevant legislative provision is inconsistently applied, such in-
consistencies should reduce the weight given to that legislative
provision because it does not present a comprehensive view of
state practice.
e. Whether a Given Interpretation Can Be Consistently Applied
The last point noted above actually gives rise to a separate
factor. Since one of the primarily goals in treaty interpretation
is to promote a uniform understanding and application of the
treaty, courts trying to decide between competing interpreta-
tions of a treaty's term should consider whether courts can
consistently apply a given interpretation. The different ap-
proaches to defining a "particular social group" provide a
good example of how one interpretation of a treaty term (the
protected characteristic approach) may lend itself to more ob-
jective and consistent application than another interpretation(the social perception approach). Evidence of inconsistent ap-
plication of a certain interpretation within a country or be-
tween countries should flag a potential problem with that in-
terpretation. In this type of situation, courts should give more
weight to the interpretation that lends itself to more uniform
application.
f. Whether the Interpretation Reflects the Human Rights Principles
Underlying the Treaty
Finally, courts should consider whether a given interpreta-
tion reflects the fundamental principles underlying the treaty.
In the case of the Refugee Convention and Protocol, the rele-
vant principles are those of international human rights, as evi-
282. See Lee, supra note 250, at 61-62 (discussing the function of the doc-
trine of jurisprudence constante).
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denced by the Convention's Preamble.283 Various scholars
have persuasively advocated the use of international human
rights law in interpreting the definition of a "refugee," includ-
ing terms such as "persecution" and "particular social
group."284 Using a common framework, like choosing an inter-
pretation that can be consistently applied, promotes uniform
implementation of the treaty. While this factor may overlap
with examination of the treaty's context and purpose, it also
provides a reasoned way to select among competing interpre-
tations by other contracting parties. 2 5 In the example dis-
cussed above regarding interpretations of PSG, the Canadian
Supreme Court's decision in Ward strongly connects the pro-
tected characteristic approach to the anti-discrimination and
human rights principles in the Refugee Convention's pream-
ble, whereas Australia derived the social perception from the
dictionary definitions of the words.
Considering all of these factors as a whole should help
courts engage in a more structured and meaningful compara-
tive analysis when interpreting treaties and incorporative stat-
utes. Although this Article proposes and examines these fac-
tors in the context of the Refugee Protocol, the same basic
factors could help guide courts when considering the views of
our sister signatories to any treaty.
B. The Interpretations of a Regional Body: The European Union
The question of how to select and weigh foreign authori-
ties is complicated enough, but another layer of complexity is
added when one turns to the question of what weight, if any,
283. See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. (invoking principles of
human rights); see also supra Part II (discussing the historical origins of the
Refugee Convention and Protocol).
284. See, e.g., Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights
Paradigm, 15 HARv. Hum. RTs. J. 133 (2002) (recognizing that refugee law
increasingly acknowledges its foundation in a human rights paradigm);
JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAw OF REFUGEE STATUS 104-05 (1991) (finding
that given the Convention drafters' intentions, "persecution may be defined
as the sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of
a failure of state protection"); MICHELLE FOSTER, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
LAW AND Socio-EcoNoMic RiGHTS (2007) 304-39 (discussing the conceptual
linkages between particular social groups and economic and social rights).
285. See NOLTE, supra note 37, at 18 (discussing cases showing that
"[s]ubsequent conduct and the object and purpose of a treaty can be closely
interrelated").
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should be given to the interpretations of a regional body, such
as the EU, which has recently taken groundbreaking steps to-
wards the creation of a Common European Asylum System
(CEAS). This question is particularly pressing, as the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security has begun citing to the EU's Qual-
ification Directive in some of its briefs. In a case that was re-
cently remanded by the Third Circuit to the BIA based, among
other things, on the BIA's failure to justify its new social visibil-
ity requirement, DHS cited the EU's Qualification Directive in
its brief to the BIA as providing support for a social perception
requirement.8 6
Since the EU itself is not a state party to the Refugee Con-
vention or Protocol, the legal issue is whether its interpreta-
tions may be attributed to its 27 Member States, or whether
each Member State's views must be considered individually.28 7
A starting point is to understand what steps the EU has taken
to interpret the Refugee Convention and Protocol at a supra-
national level. In 2004, the EU Council adopted the Minimum
Qualification Directive, the first regional, legally binding in-
strument that provides interpretive guidance on eligibility for
refugee status and subsidiary protection.288 For example, the
Directive explicates the meaning of "persecution" and each of
the five protected grounds, including "membership of a partic-
ular social group."289 The Directive also addresses issues such
286. Brief of Department of Homeland Security at 11, In re Valdiviezo-
Galdamez, No. A097-447-286 (B.I.A. 2012) (on file with author)); see also
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 589 (3d Cir.
2011). DHS reframed the requirement as "social distinction," but defined
this term as requiring that the society in question perceive the group as dis-
tinct, thereby folding social perception into the definition. DHS acknowl-
edged that literal visibility is not required. Brief of Department of Homeland
Security, supra, at 11-12.
287. The 27 EU Member States receive over a quarter of the asylum appli-
cations submitted worldwide. See ASYLUM LEVELS AND TRENDS IN INDUSTRIAL-
IZED COUNTRIES, supra note 129, at 7-8. Europe as a whole, a continent with
38 countries, received 373,700 asylum claims, about 44% of the total number
submitted worldwide and 73% of the claims submitted to industrialized na-
tions. Id.; see also UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2010, supra note 129, at 42.
288. See Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, Refugee Status and Subsidiary Protection Under
EC Law: The Qualification Directive and the Right to Be Granted Asylum, in WHOSE
FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE?: EU IMMIGRATION AND AsYLuM LAW AND
PoLICY 229, 229 (Anneliese Baldaccini, Elspeth Guild & Helen Toner eds.,
2007).
289. See Qualification Directive, supra note 143, arts. 9-10.
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as persecution by non-state actors, internal relocation, exclu-
sion from refugee status, and the cessation of refugee status.290
Under Article 38 of the Directive, Member States were re-
quired to conform their national laws and regulations to the
minimum standards in the Directive by October 10, 2006.
Significantly, the Qualification Directive sets forth only
minimum standards, leaving Member States free to provide
more favorable standards if they so desired, as long as these
standards remained compatible with the Directive. Looking
only at the Qualification Directive therefore provides little in-
formation about the actual interpretation of EU Member
States. For example, even if one interprets article 10(1) (d) of
the Qualification Directive as setting forth dual requirements
for establishing a particular social group (i.e., both a protected
characteristic and social perception), that simply means that
EU Member States may not impose a more rigorous definition of
a particular social group, but they remain free to establish a
less onerous standard, such as by allowing either criterion to
suffice. As discussed above, the 2008 survey by the ECRE indi-
cated that many EU Member States permit a particular social
group to be defined based on either a particular characteristic
or social perception. This example illustrates the importance
of looking past the language of the Qualification Directive to
the actual interpretation or practice of EU Member States.
Moreover, it remains unclear whether or to what extent
EU Member States have incorporated the Qualification Direc-
tive into their domestic laws. Studies conducted by the
UNHCR and the ECRE revealed significant discrepancies
among EU countries in the degree of implementation of the
Qualification Directive, as well as disparities among decision-
making bodies within particular countries in interpreting and
applying the Qualification Directive. When UNHCR studied
the implementation of the Directive by five states in 2007, it
discovered various levels of legislative transposition as well as
various responses from the courts. Germany and Sweden, for
example, had only partially transposed the Directive into na-
tional laws, and Greece had not transposed it at all.29 1 France
290. See id. arts. 6, 8, 11-12.
291. UNHCR, ASYLUM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A STUDY OF THE IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF THE QUALIFICATION DIREcTIvE 9 (2007), available at http://www.
unhcr.org/47302b6c2.html.
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had transposed the Directive back in 2003, before it was for-
mally adopted, so it was missing some of the provisions from
the final version.292
In addition, UNHCR found that "some courts, on some
specific issues, persisted with an interpretation based on estab-
lished national practice incompatible with the Directive."293 The
study noted that " [i] n Greece and Sweden, court decisions oc-
casionally referred to the Directive but there was no evident
uniform approach by the authorities as to which articles of the
Directive, if any, should be applied directly."294 While Swedish
court decisions commonly referred to the Directive, the Migra-
tion Board "did not refer to it at all," and the Migration Court
of Appeals "referred to it in general terms in some cases." 295
Similarly, German courts applied the Directive in some cases
but not others.296
A subsequent study in 2008 by the ECRE confirmed this
incomplete and inconsistent application of the Directive on an
even broader scale. Based on its survey of twenty EU countries,
the ECRE found it "difficult to assess the general impact of the
directive on the law and practice of the Member States, due to
divergent approaches to transposition and a relative lack of case
law."2 97 Complicating matters, "[m]any provisions were not
transposed literally, and some are mistranslated in national
laws."298 Rather than creating a new uniform practice among
Member States, the application of the directive "largely rejfects
pre-existing . .. practice, with [a few] notable exceptions."2 9 9 In
fact, the study's "overarching conclusion" was that "considera-
ble scope remains for future harmonisation."soo
The interpretation of the Qualification Directive itself is
also contested, with the meaning of "particular social group"
providing a good example. As discussed above, the House of
Lords interpreted art. 10(1) (d) of the Directive to be consis-
tent with the UNHCR Guidelines, providing two alternative
292. Id. at 35.
293. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 36.
296. Id. at 37.
297. ECRE STUDY, supra note 180, at 5 (emphasis added).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 7.
300. Id.
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ways to establish a particular social group. The ECRE, how-
ever, critiques the Directive for "allow [ing] Member States to
define 'particular social group' restrictively, as requiring that
applicants both share an innate characteristic that cannot be
changed and be perceived as a distinct group by the surround-
ing society."301 The ECRE observed that "[fortunately, many
states interpret their obligations more broadly, requiring the
fulfillment of only one of these criteria," and encouraged all
states to "use the flexibility afforded by the words 'in particu-
lar' in article 10(1) (d) to grant protection based on either an
innate characteristic or social perception, rather than requir-
ing both."30 2 The contested interpretation of "particular social
group," as defined by the Directive, shows that the national
courts will continue to play an important role in interpreting
and applying EU laws.3 03 As H61ne Lambert observes, based
on a study of nine EU countries, "the success of the harmoni-
zation, as a tool for international protection in the EU, sub-
stantially depends on the development of common judicial un-
derstanding, principles and norms concerning refugee mat-
ters."30 4
In light of these studies, U.S. courts cannot assume that
the EU's interpretation reflects the actual interpretation or
practice of its Member States, even if those Member States
have agreed to comply with the EU's interpretation. While
Member States are "bound by an important asylum acquis, . . .
large discrepancies between asylum decisions (even within sim-
ilar caseloads) still exist."305 Even after the adoption of the
Minimum Qualification Directive, "the chances of an individ-
ual asylum-seeker to find protection in the EU can vary nearly
301. Id. at 6.
302. Id. at 6, 21. The ECRE reasoned that "[t]his interpretation is consis-
tent with the Refugee Convention." Id. at 21, 36.
303. See id. at 20-21 (reviewing the divergent interpretations given to the
directive by national courts).
304. Lambert, supra note 246, at 2 (emphasis added); see also ECRE STUDY,
supra note 180, at 6 (stressing the importance of national courts in interpret-
ing and applying EU laws).
305. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Coun-
cil, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: Pol-
icy Plan on Asylum, § 4 COM (2008) 360 final (June 17, 2008) [hereinafter
Policy Plan on Asylum].
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seventy-fold, depending on where he or she applies."30 6 This
discrepancy exists, in part, because the Qualification Directive
sets only a minimum floor.307 Looking only at the Qualifica-
tion Directive would obscure the more favorable norms in
many states and hide patterns of providing greater protection
that are relevant to treaty interpretation. The Qualification Di-
rective also provides only general guidance, leaving many spe-
cific interpretive issues to be resolved by the courts.
The EU amended the Minimum Standards Qualification
Directive in December 2011, and Member States must now in-
corporate the amended version into their national laws by De-
cember 21, 2013.308 Three Member States have opted out of
the amended Directive: the United Kingdom, Ireland, and
Denmark.309 By not opting out, the other Member States have
agreed to comply with the minimum standards set forth in the
Qualification Directive.31 0 Given the remaining EU Member
306. Erika Feller, Assistant U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Re-
marks at the Public Hearing on the Future Common European Asylum Sys-
tem (Nov. 7, 2007), reprinted in 20 INT'L.J. REFUGEE L. 216, 217 (2008).
307. See id. at 219 (discussing "minimum standards" for EU member
states).
308. See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Qualification Directive:
Latest Developments (Feb. 1, 2013, 2:10 PM), http://www.ecre.org/topics/ar-
eas-of-work/protection-in-europe/92-qualification-directive.html (discussing
the new version of the directive).
309. Id. The Qualification Directive is the first among five legal instru-
ments that the EU plans to adopt by the end of 2012 for the creation of a
Common European Asylum System. See Press Release, Council of the Euro-
pean Union, Asylum Qualification Directive: Better, Clearer and More
Harmonised Standards for Identifying Persons in Need of International Pro-
tection (Nov. 24, 2011), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ue
docs/cms.data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/126305.pdf.
310. Agreement may be implied from the absence of action, such as the
decision not to opt out. The European Court of Human Rights, for example,
has construed the absence of derogations under article 15 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights as demonstrating understanding and agreement
among NATO states that they could not be held responsible for military ac-
tion that occurred outside of their jurisdictions. See Bankovic v. Belgium,
Decision on Admissibility, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 1 62 (addressing
whether the individual states that participated in NATO's military action in
Serbia could be held responsible for violating the European Convention on
Human Rights); see also GARDINER, supra note 32, at 234 ("The ECtHR has
viewed consistent absence of action, where measures might have been ex-
pected, as practice indicative of interpretative agreement."); RESTATEMENT
(THIiRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §102 cmt. c
(1987) ("Inaction may constitute state practice .... ).
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States' responses to the initial Directive, however, it seems un-
likely that the amended version will lead to genuine harmoni-
zation for quite some time, as courts and legislatures in the
various EU countries must first address the myriad of challeng-
ing issues that require interpretation.3 1 1
Besides being cautious about generalizing from the EU's
interpretation to the interpretations of its Member States, U.S.
courts should be wary that some of the EU's interpretations
have been criticized as conflicting with the Refugee Conven-
tion and Protocol. For example, Maria O'Sullivan argues that
Article 7 of the Qualification Directive conflicts with the Con-
vention by allowing a broad array of non-state actors, including
temporary/transitional entities or multinational troops, to
provide protection from persecution or serious harm.312 In ad-
dition, "ECRE and UNHCR have taken the position that some
of the directive's provisions do not reflect the 1951 Refugee
Convention, and have urged states to adopt higher stan-
dards."313 If the EU's interpretations are attributed to its Mem-
ber States, any errors would be magnified, having a dangerous
cascade-like effect on treaty interpretation worldwide as other
countries give weight to an erroneous interpretation by the
EU.
The trend towards greater exclusionism in Europe,
driven, in part, by xenophobia, should also be noted by courts
when examining the interpretations of our sister signatories in
the EU. Recognition of increasing exclusionism among some
of the EU's Member States was actually one of the catalysts be-
hind creating a Common European Asylum System.314 The
European Commission's Policy Plan on Asylum specifically
noted border control mechanisms that "lack the necessary
311. Lambert, supra note 246, at 14 ("[A] general belief exists among
judges that other EU countries' practice is not worth refening to.") (emphasis
added). According to Lambert, "the role of transnational jurisprudence
(and therefore of national courts and tribunals as decision-makers) is in fact
essential to the establishment of a truly 'common' European asylum system."
Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
312. See Maria O'Sullivan, Acting the Part: Can Non-State Entities Provide Pro-
tection under International Refugee Law?, 24 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 85 (2012).
313. ECRE Study, supra note 180, at 4.
314. See Michael Campagna, Note, Effective Protection Against Refoulement
in Europe: Minimizing Exclusionism in Search of a Common European Asylum Sys-
tem, 17 U. MIAu INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 144-45 (2010) (describing the
history of the CEAS).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
472 [Vol. 45:391
20131 FOREIGN A UTHORITIES IN U.S. ASYLUM ADJUDICATION
mechanisms to identify potential asylum seekers."3 15 Ironically,
however, various components of the Common European Asy-
lum System are now creating a zone of exclusion.316
In sum, the EU's movement towards a Common Euro-
pean Asylum System signals the potential for expedited norm
convergence, which could be both beneficial and dangerous
for treaty interpretation.3 17 If the EU eventually speaks with
one voice on asylum issues, and that voice reflects the actual
interpretation and practice of its member states, ascertaining
the views of a number of our sister signatories will become
much easier. By promoting norm convergence and propelling
treaty interpretation in a particular direction, the EU has the
potential to help lift standards across the board, promote in-
terpretations that are more protective of refugee rights and
consistent with international human rights principles, and en-
hance equality in the asylum process.318 However, the EU also
has the potential to drive interpretation in the opposite direc-
tion, lowering standards (as has already happened in some ar-
eas as a result of the Minimum Qualification Directive), nar-
rowing the scope of protection, and excluding ever-greater
numbers of people from international protection.319 The Eu-
ropean Court of Justice (ECJ), which interprets EU law to en-
sure that it is applied in a uniform way in all Member States,
will likely play a critical role in resolving disputes about how to
315. Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: Policy Plan on Asylum;
An Integrated Approach to Protection across the EU - Impact Assessment, § 2.1.2.1,
COM (2008) 360 (June 17, 2008).
316. See Silas W. Allard, Comment, Casualties ofDisharmony: The Exclusion of
Asylum Seekers Under the Auspices of the Common European Asylum System, 24 EM-
ORY INT'L L. REV. 295 (2010) (discussing flaws in the CEAS).
317. See Lambert, supra note 246, at 16 ("[ilt is now strongly believed that
the communitarization of asylum/refugee law is forcing change more rap-
idly.").
318. The EU specifies that not only the Geneva Convention, but also "the
evolving jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
and the full respect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms will
be a constant reference for [the asylum policy] strategy." Policy Plan on Asy-
lum, supra note 305, at § 2.
319. See ECRE STUDY, supra note 180, at 5 ("In [some] areas, implementa-
tion appears to have lowered standards, mostly around the definition of a particular
social group, or insufficient safeguards against refoulement.") (first emphasis
added).
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interpret the Qualification Directive, including different inter-
pretations of a "particular social group." At this point, with
only minimum standards that have not even been fully imple-
mented, U.S. courts cannot attribute the interpretations of the
EU to its member states, but they should watch for areas of
greater convergence over time and remain mindful of whether
those developments represent a progression or regression of
current standards for international protection.
C. The Interpretations of UNHCR
Just as a regional body, such as the EU, raises interesting
legal issues relevant to assessing the interpretations of our sis-
ter signatories, so does the role of UNHCR. In many countries
that are parties to the Convention and/or Protocol, the obliga-
tion of performing refugee status determination falls on
UNHCR, rather than on the state. States may entrust UNHCR
to perform this function through Memoranda of Understand-
ing or simply through a "tacit quid pro quo," whereby the gov-
ernment accedes to the Refugee Convention and, in return,
UNHCR agrees to bear the cost of identifying eligible refu-
gees. 320
In this situation, where States Parties have effectively dele-
gated their job of interpreting the Convention and/or Proto-
col to UNHCR, and UNHCR has assumed functions tradition-
ally performed by the state, one could argue that UNHCR's
interpretations constitute subsequent practice and "stand-in"
for the interpretations of the state. 321 This argument gains
320. Mark Pallis, The Operation of UNHCR's Accountability Mechanisms, 37
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 869, 877, 886 (2005); see also Alice Farmer, Refugee
Responses, State-like Behavior, and Accountability for Human Rights Violations: A
Case Study of Sexual Violence in Guinea's Refugee Camps, 9 YALE HuM. RTs. &
DEV. L.J. 44, 76-77 (2006) ("UNHCR has signed certain memoranda of un-
derstanding with the host government [Guinea] that allow it to take on cer-
tain state-like functions in running the camps. The transfer of power from
the government to UNHCR supports the state-like character of UNHCR's
operations . . .. In both its supervisory and direct-service provision roles,
UNHCR takes on many functions normally attributed to a government.");
GUGLIELMO VERDIRAME & BARBARA HARRELL-BOND, RIGHTS IN EXILE: JANUS-
FACED HUMANITAlUNISM 113 (2005) ("Governments . . . resented what they
perceived, at some level, to be a usurpation of power, but were also relieved
not to have to deal with the 'problem.'").
321. This reading of "subsequent practice" comports with decisions of the
ICJ, which has recognized that the "output of an international organization
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force from Article 35 of the Convention and Article II of the
Protocol, which create a "nexus between UNHCR's role and
the obligations of states."3 22 Article 35 of the Convention pro-
vides that States Parties "undertake to co-operate" with
UNHCR "in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particu-
lar facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provi-
sions of this Convention."323 Article II of the Protocol imposes
the same obligation. UNHCR relies on these provisions, as well
as on its founding Statute, as legal justification for giving inter-
pretative guidance to governments. Unlike treaties that re-
quire the consent of states parties prior to intervention by an
international organization, Article 35 of the Convention and
Article II of the Protocol have been construed as allowing
UNHCR to perform its functions, including refugee status de-
termination, without an invitation from the state. 324 Thus, sim-
ply by ratifying the Convention and/or Protocol, countries ar-
guably agree to follow UNHCR's interpretations. 3 2 5
UNHCR, however, has repeatedly emphasized that the
primary responsibility for refugees lies with the state and that
it only exercises authority on a transitional basis.326 Citing its
has the potential to constitute subsequent practice for the purposes of the
Vienna rules." GARDINER, supra note 32, at 248 (discussing Legality of the
Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 66 (July 8)). Since UNHCR is techni-
cally a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, rather than an international
organization, it is also worth noting that the ICJ has "recognized that inter-
pretation may evolve through the political organs of the UN." Id. at 249 (cit-
ing Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 11 27-28 (July 9)).
322. Marjoleine Zieck, Vanishing Points of the Refugee Law Regime: Response to
James Hathaway, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 217, 235-36 (2005).
323. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 35.
324. See Walter IMlin, Supervising the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees: Article 35 and Beyond, in REFUGEE PRoTECrION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw: UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTEcTION
613, 623 (Erika Feller, Volker Tfirk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003) (deriv-
ing such a conclusion from the UNHCR statute and Refugee Convention).
325. See id. at 627 ("[Case law] acknowledges that, as part of States Parties'
duty to cooperate with UNHCR and to accept its supervisory role under Arti-
cle 35 of the 1951 Convention and article II of the 1967 Protocol, they have
to take into account Executive Committee Conclusions, the UNHCR Hand-
book, UNHCR guidelines, and other UNHCR positions on matters of law (for
example amicus curiae and similar submissions to courts .. . ), when applying
the 1951 Convention and its Protocol.").
326. See, e.g., UNHCR, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's
Programme, Note on International Protection, 2, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/930
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own limited resources and lack of legal authority, UNHCR
maintains that it cannot, and should not, be seen as a substi-
tute for the state. UNHCR perceives its relationship with the
Government as one of "active cooperation" and construes its
purpose as "ensuring that Governments take the necessary ac-
tion."3 2 7 Treating UNHCR as a defacto state may be a danger-
ous proposition, as this posture could weaken both UNHCR's
and States Parties' abilities to "promote respect for refugee
law."3 28 As UNHCR's role becomes more prominent, the no-
tion of state responsibility withers.329 Allowing UNHCR's inter-
pretations to "stand in" for the interpretations of the state may
simply create a slippery slope towards affirming states' abdica-
tion of responsibilities to UNHCR, thereby undermining the
Convention's goal of promoting state responsibility for the
protection of refugees.
A different argument for treating UNHCR's interpreta-
tions as a form of "subsequent practice," which does not in-
volve ascribing it with any attributes of a de facto state, might
highlight how its interpretations often relect state practice.
Due to its presence on the ground in so many countries,
UNHCR can directly observe decision-making, as well as access
(July 7, 2000) ('While the main responsibility for safeguarding the rights of
refugees lies with States, UNHCR's statutory role is to assist governments to
take the necessary measures, starting with asylum and ending with the reali-
zation of durable solutions.'); UNHCR, Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner's Programme, Note on International Protection, 1 13, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.96/830 (Sept. 7, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Note on International
Protection] ("Since sovereign States have the primary responsibility for re-
specting and ensuring the fundamental rights of everyone within their terri-
tory and subject to their jurisdiction, effective protection of refugees re-
quires action by the Government of the country of asylum on their behalf.");
see also Volker Turk & Elizabeth Eyster, Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR,
22 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 159, 163 (2010) ("[T]he main responsibility for safe-
guarding the rights of refugees lies with states.").
327. 1994 Note on International Protection, supra note 326, 1 13.
328. VERDIRARME & HARRELL-BOND, supra note 320, at 113 (" [B]y assuming
responsibility for status determination UNHCR weakened its ability to pro-
mote respect for refugee law.").
329. See Turk & Eyster, supra note 326, at 164 (quoting Amy Slaughter &
Jeff Crisp, A Surrogate State? The Role of UNHCR in Protracted Refugee Situations,
(EUPA Working Papers, Research Paper No. 168, 2009)) ("[T]he notion of
state responsibility was weakened further, while UNHCR assumed (and was
perceived to assume) an increasingly important and even preeminent
role.").
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statistics and other information that provide a more complete
picture of state practice than could reasonably be obtained by
reviewing decisions from individual countries one at a time.
Some scholars therefore take the perspective that "the
[UNHCR] Handbook records the practice of states parties to the
Convention."3 3 0 For example, in analyzing the European
Court of Justice's decision on the provision of the Qualifica-
tion Directive pertaining to the cessation of refugee status,
Roger Errera notes that "state practice has been aptly summed up by
the UNHCR" 331 Certain courts have also endorsed this perspec-
tive. The House of Lords endorsed this approach in relying on
the UNHCR Handbook to provide guidance on the issue of
persecution by non-State actors. The Lords reasoned that
" [w] hile the Handbook is not by any means itself a source of
law, many signatory States have accepted the guidance which
on their behalf the UNHCR was asked to provide, and in those
circumstances it constitutes, in our judgment, good evidence of
what has come to be international practice within Art. 31(3) (b) of
the Vienna Convention."3 3 2 Lower courts, however, have not
always followed this rationale. In one case, the U.K Immigra-
tion Appeals Tribunal noted that the UNHCR Handbook "is
not necessarily a guide to state practice, because it may not relate to
state practice in any particular paragraph but more to
330. GARDINER, supra note 32, at 249 n.138 (emphasis added); see also Ar-
thur C. Helton, Refugee Protection Under International Law, C399 ALI-ABA 59
(1989) (stating that "soft law" sources such as the UNHCR Handbook can be
"evidence of state practice").
331. Roger Errera, Cessation and Assessment of New Circumstances: A Comment
on Abdulla CJEU, 2 March, 2010, at 11, (International Association of Refugee
Law Judges - European Chapter Conference, Sept. 23-24, 2010), available at
http://www.iarlj.org/general/images/stories/lisbon-sep_201 0/errera.pdf
(discussing the European Court ofJustice's decision in Joined Cases C-175/
08, C-176/08, C-178/08, & C-179/98, Abdulla v. Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land, 2010 E.C.R. 1-01493). Other scholars, however, have pointed out con-
flicts between UNHCR's interpretation of the cessation clauses and the inter-
pretations of some states. See Marissa Elizabeth Cwik, Note, Forced to Fee and
Forced to Repatriate? How the Cessation Clause of Article I C(5) and (6) of the 1951
Refugee Convention Operates in International Law and Practice, 44 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 711, 726-27 (2011) (discussing differences among UNHCR's inter-
pretation of the cessation clauses and the interpretation of the High Court
of Australia, Germany and the ECJ).
332. R v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Adan [1999] 4 All E.R.
774 (A.C.) 500 (emphasis added), reprinted in 11 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 702
(1999).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
477
IArfERNA TIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
UNHCR's exhortations."3 3 3 This point is well taken, as not all
of UNHCR's guidelines reflect actual state practice; some are
clearly intended to mold state practice in a particular direc-
tion.
The Federal Administrative Court of Germany has like-
wise found that various statements from the UNHCR, includ-
ing its guidelines addressing the cessation of refugee status,
"provide no indication of an existence of uniform national
practices."3 34 The Court noted that, "[t]o the extent that they
point out that the framework for substantive analysis takes ac-
count of 'State practice' . . . there is no indication of the actual
existence of a uniform state practice."335 In rejecting the argu-
ment that the Conclusions of UNHCR's Executive Committee
reflect state practice, the Court stressed that "only 68 (and
thus less than half) of the Member States of the Geneva Refu-
gee Convention belong to the Executive Committee."336 The
Court further observed that the Conclusions did "not even re-
flect the state practice of the states that are members of the
Executive Committee [as] shown by the fact that Germany be-
longs to the committee, yet according to the UNHCR Ger-
many has never conformed to its requirements in practice."337
While UNHCR's Handbook "has had immense influence
on state practice" and certainly deserves "a measure of defer-
ence," there are areas where UNHCR's interpretations are not
grounded in state practice.338 For example, ProfessorJames C.
Hathaway has criticized UNHCR's support for a broad inter-
pretation of the Convention's provisions related to cessation of
refugee status, noting that UNHCR claimed the interpretation
"is now well-grounded in State Practice" yet conceded that
"declarations [of cessation due to changed conditions] are in-
333. Re AA, [2005] UKIAT 00104, 1 67 (emphasis added), reprinted in 20
INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 203, 215 (2008).
334. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court]
1 34, 10 C 33.07, OVG 16 A 4354/05.A (Ger.) (reprinted in 21 INr'LJ. REFU-
GEE L. 549 (2009)).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. SeeJames C. Hathaway & Colin J. Harvey, Framing Refugee Protection in
the New World Disorder, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257, 296-97 (2001).
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frequent."339 In addition, Professor Hathaway observes that
courts in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada
have all challenged UNHCR's interpretation of the exclusion
of persons who have committed serious nonpolitical crimes
under Article 1(F) of the Convention, finding it doubtful that
UNHCR's interpretation "will survive in state practice" given
the "logically compelling" judicial trend to the contrary.3 40
In short, determining whether or not UNHCR's interpre-
tation of a particular provision of the Refugee Convention or
Protocol reflects state practice or is meant to shape state practice
could be a very tricky undertaking for a U.S. court. Even if a
court determines that a certain interpretation by UNHCR re-
flects state practice, an even more difficult question follows re-
garding how much weight to give that interpretation. Should
the court give it as much weight as it would give to an interpre-
tation adopted by a large number of states that satisfy the crite-
ria set forth above? How are courts to determine how many
states and which states endorse the interpretation adopted by
UNHCR?
Currently, the role of UNHCR's interpretations in U.S.
asylum adjudications remains unclear. While U.S. courts do
frequently consult UNHCR's Handbook in asylum cases, they
have otherwise "displayed no coherency in their use of
UNHCR views published elsewhere, relying on its advisory
opinions or amicus briefs as an aid to treaty interpretation in
some cases and simply ignoring its views in others." 34 1 Courts
would do well to clarify the role of UNHCR and to consider its
views with greater consistency as they approach asylum cases
with the serious task of interpreting an international treaty.
However, courts should engage in a separate analysis that in-
volves examining the views of our sister signatories. UNHCR's
views cannot serve as a substitute or shortcut for this analysis.
The most persuasive support for a given interpretation, of
course, would be where the weight of foreign authorities and
the views of UNHCR are in alignment.
339. James C. Hathaway, The Right of States to Repatriate Former Refugees, 20
OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 175, 204 n.105 (2005) (alteration in original); see
also Zieck, supra note 322, at 217-18 (responding to Hathaway's argument).
340. Hathaway & Harvey, supra note 338, at 313.
341. Farbenblum, supra note 7, at 1077.
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D. Fears of Weakening Protection for Asylum Seekers
in the United States
One of the potential risks involved in giving weight to the
interpretations of other contracting parties is that the result-
ing rules and standards may weaken protections for asylum
seekers in the United States. On some issues, U.S. asylum law
may be more favorable to asylum-seekers than the law of other
countries. Would we really want to risk making U.S. asylum law
"worse" by looking abroad? As an example, consider the ques-
tion of whether a gay individual who can avoid persecution by
remaining "discreet" (i.e. closeted, at least in public) should
be eligible for asylum. The United States has never required a
gay asylum seeker to modify his or her behavior in order to
avoid persecution. During the past decade, Australia and the
United Kingdom have similarly rejected any discretion re-
quirement, after years of denying gay and lesbian individuals
asylum on this basis.342 Yet other countries, even ones that are
generally supportive of gay rights, remain divided about this
issue, as evidenced by recent requests for clarification from the
ECJ.
In 2010, Germany requested a preliminary ruling from
the ECJ on whether "a homosexual person [can] be told to
live with his or her sexual orientation in his or her home coun-
try in secret and not allow it to become known to others."3 43
While this request was withdrawn after the applicant was
granted asylum, the question was recently revived by the
Netherlands, which submitted three requests for preliminary
rulings on this same issue in 2012.344 These three cases, which
342. See HJ (Iran) v Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't (Hf and H),
[2010] UKSC 31 [22], [2011] 1 A.C. 596 [625] (appeal taken from Eng. &
Wales C.A.) (rejecting a requirement that a person keep their sexual orienta-
tion concealed in order to avoid persecution); Appellant S395/2002 v Minister
for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (S395) (2003) 216 CLR 473 (Austi.)
(same); see also James C. Hathaway and Jason Pobjoy, Queer Cases Make Bad
Law, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 315, 324-30 (2012) (discussing the rejec-
tion of the "duty to be discrete").
343. Reference for a Preliminary Ruling from the Oberverwaltungsgericht
far das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Germany) Lodged on 1 December 2010
- Kashayar Khavand v Federal Republic of Germany (Case C-563/10), 2011
O.J. (C 38) 7.
344. See Reference for a Preliminary Ruling from the Raad van State
(Netherlands) Lodged on 27 April 2012 - Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel
vX (Case C-199/12), 2012 O.J. (C 217) 7 (involving an applicant from Sierra
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involve gay asylum seekers from Sierra Leone, Uganda, and
Senegal, ask the ECJ to address, inter alia, whether "foreign na-
tionals with a homosexual orientation [can] be expected to
conceal their orientation from everyone in their country of or-
igin in order to avoid persecution," and, if not, whether they
can "be expected to exercise restraint, and if so, to what ex-
tent."34 5 The requests further inquire whether "greater re-
straint [can] be expected of homosexuals than of heterosexu-
als." 3 4 6 If the ECJ were to find that "concealment" or some
level of "restraint" can be expected of gay asylum seekers, then
this interpretation would be binding on all members of the
EU. Should U.S. courts give weight to such a decision, even
though it is inconsistent with U.S. precedents?
Another example of an issue where U.S. law may be more
favorable to asylum seekers than the law in many other coun-
tries concerns non-state actors as agents of persecution. The
United States has long recognized that non-state actors may be
agents of persecution as long as the state is unable or unwilling
provide protection. 47 France and Germany, on the other
hand, are among the countries that have traditionally refused
to view non-state actors as agents of persecution.34 8 According
to a 2004 survey by UNHCR, at least fourteen countries did
Leone); Reference for a Preliminary Ruling from the Raad van State
(Netherlands) Lodged on 27 April 2012 - Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel
v Y (Case C-200/12), 2012 O.J. (C 217) 8 (involving an applicant from
Uganda); Reference for a Preliminary Ruling from the Raad van State
(Netherlands) Lodged on 27 April 2012 - Z v Minister voor Immigratie en
Asiel (Case C-201/12) 2012 O.J. (C 217) 8 (involving an applicant from Se-
negal).
345. Cases cited supra note 344.
346. Cases cited supra note 344. In addition, the requests for preliminary
rulings inquire, "if a distinction can be made between forms of expression
which relate to the core area of the [sexual] orientation and forms of expres-
sion which do not, what should be understood to constitute the core area of
the orientation and in what way can it be determined?"
347. See, e.g., In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) ("[H]arm
or suffering had to be inflicted either by the government of a country or by
persons or an organization that the government was unable or unwilling to
control.").
348. See Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign
and International Law by National Courts, 102 Am. J. INT'L L. 241, 265-66
(2008) (explaining that French courts denied asylum to Algerians escaping
militias, while German Courts denied asylum to Afghans, Bosnians, Sri
Lankans, and Somalis persecuted by non-state actors).
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not recognize persecution by non-state actors. 349 Moreover,
the language of the EU's recast Qualification Directive recog-
nizes non-state actors in a much more limited way than U.S.
law, requiring not only that the state be unable or unwilling to
provide protection, but also that "parties or organisations con-
trolling the State, or a substantial part of the territory of the
State," including "international organizations," be unable or
unwilling to do so. 35 0 Thus, for example, if a majority clan with
a militia in Somalia or the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan could protect asylum seekers
fleeing these countries from harm by non-state actors, then
their asylum applications could potentially be denied under
the minimum standard set forth in the Qualification Directive,
even if their States were unable or unwilling to protect them.
Should European countries decide to follow this minimum
standard, the weight of foreign authorities could shift towards
far weaker protection for individuals persecuted by non-state
actors.
These examples may foment fears that giving weight to
foreign authorities will constrict U.S. asylum law in crucial
349. See U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, EVALUATION AND POLICY
ANALYSIS UNIT, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION IN
NATIONAL ASYLUM LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE, 1 247 (2004), avail-
able at http://wwwjrseurope.org/accompanydetainees/docs/Crawley%20Re
port%20on%20EU%20Gender%20and%2OAsylum.pdf (surveying the rec-
ognition of non-state actors as agents of persecution in the laws of European
countries).
350. See Council Directive 2011/95/EU, supra note 144, art. 6(b)-(c).
This language regarding international organizations has been criticized by
UNHCR, Amnesty International, and others. UNHCR, for example, has
commented:
[N]on-state actors in principle should not be considered actors of
protection. Parties and organizations, including international orga-
nizations, do not have the attributes of a state and do not have the
same obligations under international law. In practice, this means
that their ability to enforce the rule of law is limited, and thus their
ability to render protection ... would not qualify an international
body as capable of providing protection.
UNHCR, COMMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL FOR A DIREC-
TIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON MINIMUM STAN-
DARDS FOR THE QUALIFICATION AND STATUS OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS OR
STATELESS PERSONS AS BENEFICIARIES OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION AND THE
CONTENT OF THE PROTECTION GRANTED (COM(2009)551, 21 OCTOBER 2009),
at 5 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4c5037f99.pdf.
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ways. One might wonder whether U.S. courts would overrule
existing precedents based on the development of more restric-
tive interpretations by our sister signatories. While the Su-
preme Court has occasionally overruled precedents in other
contexts, such as admiralty law, based on subsequent develop-
ments in other nations' interpretations of certain rules, this is
by no means the inevitable result of a practice that involves
considering foreign authorities.35 ' The principle of giving
weight to the interpretations of our sister signatories does not
require "unthinking acquiescence."35 2 The basic idea is simply
to give the interpretations of other signatories "the courtesy of
respectful consideration," even if we disagree.353 After consid-
ering the views of other signatories, a court may provide sound
reasons for why those views are unpersuasive. However, a court
should not just ignore interpretations by other signatories, as
is now the norm, or depart from those interpretations without
a cogent explanation. 354 Ultimately, in order to move towards
more uniform interpretation of refugee status, states must en-
gage in a productive dialogue and seek to persuade one an-
other about how to interpret various provisions of the Refugee
351. See, e.g., United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 397-98
(1975) (overruling an earlier admiralty rule and reasoning that "[t]he courts
of every major maritime nation except [the United States] have long since
abandoned th[e] rule"); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375,
388-89 (1970) (overruling a longstanding admiralty rule based, inter alia,
on judicial and legislative developments in England).
352. See Van Alstine, supra note 86, at 1941. Van Alstine describes the
proper approach as one of "controlled deference, which at a minimum re-
quires respectful consideration of the persuasive force of a foreign court's
interpretive analysis." Id. at 1941-42; see also Onyeanusi v. Pan Am., 952 F.2d
788, 791-92 (3d Cir. 1992) (discussing a conflict between a French and an
American case in interpreting a treaty and concluding that the U.S. court's
interpretation was "more sound").
353. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660 (2004) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) ("[E]ven if we disagree, we surely owe the conclusions reached by
appellate courts of other [treaty] signatories the courtesy of respectful con-
sideration.").
354. SeeJenny S. Martinez, Towards an InternationalJudicial System, 56 STAN.
L. REv. 429, 513 (2003) ("[Nlational courts interpreting international law
should consider relevant decisions of foreign courts interpreting the same
treaty or principle of customary international law and should not depart
from those precedents without articulating clear reasons for doing so.") (empha-
sis added).
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Convention and Protocol. 55 Avoiding foreign authorities out
of fear makes it impossible to accomplish this goal.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the U.S. Supreme Court requires adjudicators to
give weight to the views of our sister signatories when inter-
preting an international treaty, lower courts have generally
failed to apply this principle, likely due to lack of more specific
guidance as well as the extra effort involved in researching for-
eign laws. An additional hurdle exists in the area of asylum
law, as our domestic statute shrouds the international treaty
that it incorporates. Across Europe, where states' international
obligations towards refugees have likewise been transposed
into national laws, the same pattern emerges, with judges
"rarely us[ing] each other's decisions within the EU."35 6 This
Article urges U.S. judges to pierce the veil of the incorporative
statute and treat the Refugee Protocol like any other treaty
that triggers the principle of giving weight to the interpreta-
tions of our sister signatories. In so doing, U.S. courts can pro-
mote a more harmonized understanding of what it means to
be a refugee and encourage transnational solutions to a trans-
national problem.
The United States is one of the largest recipients of refu-
gees in the world, with one of the most developed and influen-
tial bodies of case law on asylum. As such, it has the potential
to play a powerful role in promoting uniformity among States
Parties to the Protocol and to give effect to Congress's goals of
complying with our international obligations. Active participa-
tion in the dialogue among nations regarding the interpreta-
tion of the Refugee Convention and Protocol is, however, es-
sential to achieving this goal. Certainly, dialogue has its costs.
Language barriers, difficulty accessing foreign decisions, lack
of familiarity with other legal systems, and time constraints all
355. Cf ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 74-75 (2004) (ar-
guing, in the context of constitutional interpretation, that judges who refuse
to participate in transnational dialogue undermine their own power to influ-
ence others).
356. Lambert, supra note 246, at 8.
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pose practical challenges to transnational dialogue .35  The
practical challenges are substantial and require detailed exam-
ination in a manner beyond the scope of this Article. A cul-
tural mindset about the utility of foreign authority may also
create an "exaggerated sense of the barriers to dialogue," de-
spite clear guidance from the Supreme Court.358 In addition,
this Article has also stressed the new, unique challenge posed
for treaty interpretation by the EU's recent steps towards a re-
gional asylum system, as well as the longstanding issue (still
unresolved among U.S. courts) about the role and relevance
of UNHCR's interpretations. The greatest cost, however,
would come from allowing these challenges to silence a con-
versation about the meaning of the Refugee Convention that
has been percolating for the past sixty years.
' Such silence would impede the development of evolving
norms, resulting in a stale Convention, leaving millions vulner-
able who might otherwise have been protected. Such silence
would also reflect an abdication of the United States' role in
shaping refugee standards worldwide. If U.S. courts do not cite
the decisions of our sister signatories, they will soon stop citing
us, since judges generally refer to precedents from countries
with which they have "reciprocal relations." 3 5 9 In the long
term, this will mean that U.S. jurisprudence will be less influ-
ential and play a much smaller role in shaping the interpreta-
tions of other countries. Instead of exporting our norms, we
will bury them within. Indeed, the international influence of
the U.S. Supreme Court has already diminished due to its gen-
eral reluctance to engage foreign authority in other areas.360
357. See id. at 12 (stating that while language is not an "insurmountable"
obstacle, inaccessibility ofjudgments, judges' lack of time, and lack of famili-
arity with foreign legal systems may present larger challenges).
358. Id. at 13.
359. See id. at 15.
360. See Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of Foreign Law on
Her Court, and Vice Versa, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 2009, at A14 (noting Justice
Ginsburg's view that "the failure to engage foreign decisions [has] resulted
in diminished influence for the United States Supreme Court"); see also
Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the Inter-
national Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 37 (1998) (the former
Justice of the Canadian Supreme Court opines that "the failure of the
United States Supreme Court to take part in the international dialogue
among the courts of the world, particularly on human rights issues, is con-
tributing to a growing isolation and diminished influence .... [T]his ten-
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Rather than succumbing to this diminished influence, appel-
late judges and attorneys should actively engage with the inter-
pretations of our sister signatories. They should recognize that
refugee law has the potential to become the centerpiece of
transnational dialogue in the realm of treaty interpretation.3 61
dency to look inward may well make the judgments of U.S. courts increas-
ingly less relevant internationally.").
361. See James C. Hathaway, Developments, A Forum for the Transnational
Development of Refugee Law: The JARLS's Advanced Refugee Law Workshop, 15
INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 418 (2003); see also Lambert, supra note 246, at 4 (assert-
ing that refugee law "has evolved mostly under the influence ofjudges" and
arguing that it "provides tremendous opportunity in terms of seeking a
greater transnational judicial role").
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